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This thesis considers how destruction of biodiversity and destruction of diverse knowledges and 
cultures are deeply connecting, examining the case study of the Santa Cruz Autonomy 
Movement in the Bolivian lowlands. In 2005, a wave of anti-neoliberal social movements swept 
indigenous labor activist Evo Morales, to power. Morales and his party, the MAS (Movimiento 
al Socialismo or Movement towards Socialism) promised a “process of change” away from the 
nation’s colonial and neoliberal pasts, involving nationalization of natural resources, land 
redistribution, and environmental protections based around the indigenous ideology of “Vivir 
Bien” (living well) of all living things. Elites in Santa Cruz, enriched by agroindustry, organized 
a powerful movement for regional autonomy lasting from 2004-2008 which sought to evade 
Morales’ redistributive land reforms and maintain the deeply unequal status quo. Most studies of 
the Santa Cruz Autonomy movement concern themselves with the ideological, identity, and 
performance aspects of the movement, however I argue that the autonomy movement is best 
understood as a political ecology movement, highlighting the centrality of land, nature, and 
agriculture in the movement’s goals. Utilizing Vandana Shiva’s idea of “Monocultures of the 
Mind” I argue that the autonomy movement can be seen as dual processes of producing 
homogeneity of both the environment and the society of Santa Cruz. Movement leaders sought to 
produce and perform a homogenous regional identity, a “monoculture of the mind” in order to 
legitimize control of territory and expand their physical systems of monoculture. Despite claims 
from the MAS and scholarship that the autonomy movement was defeated in 2010, studying the 
movement from a political ecology lens demonstrates the essential successes of the Santa Cruz 
elites not only  to expand their systems of monocultures within the department, but also to embed 




CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION: 
THE BOLIVIAN RIGHT AND THE DESTRUCTION OF DIVERSITY  
 
In November of 2019 President Evo Morales, about to enter his fourth term, was forced to flee 
the country when the Organization of American (OAS) alleged electoral fraud and the Bolivian 
military withdrew support from his presidency. This marked the end of Morales’ remarkable 14-
year presidency, which won re-election in 2005, 2009, and 2014 at higher margins than any other 
political party in recent Bolivian history, owing to Morales’ continuous support from Bolivia’s 
indigenous majority thanks to his policies which tripled the size of the economy and significantly 
investments to social welfare which cut poverty rates in half (Farthing 2020, 5).  Morales, and 
many international observers, decried a “coup” of the Bolivian right (Fabricant and Gustafson 
2020, 105). ).  The downfall of Morales brought about national and international concerns of US 
involvement, due in part to Bolivia’s lengthy history of foreign-backed coup d’états however 
domestic politics played the defining role in Morales’ downfall (Farthing 2020, 5), particularly 
his right-wing opposition in the Lowlands department of Santa Cruz. 
 Evo Morales and his party, the Movimiento al Socialismo (Movement Towards Socialism 
or the MAS), came to power amid waves of left and indigenous social movements in Latin 
America which not only sought redistributive reform and racial justice, but “challenged the 
underlying principles and material structures of capitalist modernity.” (Colletta and Raftopolous 
2020, 12). Morales, the son of Aymara peasants and the leader of the Coca grower’s union, was 
the first indigenous president of Bolivia, a nation which is one of two majority-indigenous 
countries in Latin America. His election marked a seismic shift in Bolivia’s history, not only due 




agenda to “decolonize the state” through the promotion of indigenous frameworks for 
environmental sustainability and implementation of socialist redistributive policies. In its 
entirety, Morales asserted his government constituted a processo de cambio (process of change) 
and a “refounding” of the nation which expelled the legacies of colonialism and neoliberalism 
and replaced them a with a “plurinational” state of indigenous nations (Villarreal 2020, 4). 
Morales incorporated indigenous ideas complementarity, vivir bien (living well) of all beings and 
an ethic of respect for- and non-commodification of- the environment, as was solidified  in the 
2010 Ley de Derechos de Madre Tierra (Law of the Rights of Mother Earth). 
Morales’s platform rested on three main pillars: the ‘nationalization’ of the hydrocarbon 
industry and the use of hydrocarbon rents for social programs; the rewriting of the constitution to 
incorporate indigenous and socialist values; and largescale land reform (Ezinna 2008, 218). 
While Morales land reforms efforts have perhaps received the least attention from 
international media and scholarship, these efforts posed perhaps the most direct threat to the 
reproduction of the capitalist system (Ezinna 2008, 218).  While nationalization of natural gas 
provided crucial social programming and “bonds”, small loans which helped reduce poverty in 
the country, the prospect of land reform promised a radical break from the primary commodity 
export-dependent system which Morales inherited. Land reform offered the possibility to create a 
system in which peasants and indigenous groups could sustain themselves, reproducing their 
lives and lifeways. The issue of land holds immense importance in Latin America, where the 
land distribution is the most uneven in the world, an issue dating back to the colonial era and 
progressively worsened through liberal and neoliberal reforms. At the time of the most recent 
agrarian census in Bolivia, 686 farm units, just 0.22% of total landowners, owned the majority of 




Bolivia’s land distribution rivaling Chile for the most unequal in the world (Weisbrot and 
Sandoval 2008, 3).  
 On May 2, 2006, Morales announced a massive land reform which would expropriate 
unproductive land from large-scale landowners and redistribute it to Bolivia’s landless peasant 
population.  In a country of 9 million, as many of 2.5 million Bolivians are landless peasants, 
many of which have been displaced from the countryside and live on the periphery of urban 
areas. Thus, the question of land was crucial for Morales to address. (Ezinna 2008, 223) 
The prospect of land reform, which threatened to expropriate land from lowland Landifundios 
(largscale landowners) along with putting an end to the profitable business of land-speculation 
(Kohl and Bresnahan 2010, 9) led to a swift backlash from the eastern lowlands. This backlash 
was concentrated in Santa Cruz, the largest department in Bolivia and home to the majority of 
the country’s industrial agriculture (Fig 1). Santa Cruz is among the whitest departments along 
with the wealthiest, owing to the large-scale agriculture, which thrived amid the commodity 
booms of the 1990s and 2000s (Soruco, Plata and Medieros 2008).  
Bolivia is a highly centralist state, with departmental governments lacking any real power 
until the election of the first departmental governors in 2005. However Santa Cruz elites had 
long maintained control over the region through a series of semi-public, non-governmental 
institutions, centered around the Comite Pro-Santa Cruz (CPSC), a unelected committee of 
agribusiness and industrial elites (Fabricant 2016, 189). These elites had grown accustomed to 
holding a privileged position in national politics, and were shaken by the 2005 election of 






Fig 1.1: Map of the Departments of Bolivia. Source:  Ilgren, E & Ramirez, R & Claros, E & 
Fernandez, P & Guardia, R & Dalenz, J & Kamiya, Y & Hoskins, John. (2012). Fiber Width as a 
Determinant of Mesothelioma Induction and Threshold*Bolivian Crocidolite: Epidemiological 
Evidence from Bolivia*Mesothelioma Demography and Exposure Pathways. Annals of 
Respiratory Medicine. Ann Resp Med. 
 
The CPSC organized its first protest for regional autonomy in 2004 alongside the waves 




capital, Santa Cruz de la Sierra. The election of Morales heightened the fears of the CPSC, and 
the Santa Cruz Autonomy movement was born, drawing crowds of as many as 350,000 
participants. In a 2006 referendum, 56% of Bolivian voters rejected autonomy, however, 71% in 
Santa Cruz voted in favor. In 2008, 86% in Santa Cruz voted for autonomy. (Eaton 2011, 296) 
While the autonomy movement asserted itself as a defense of democracy and the self-
determination of “Cruceños” against the impositions of the state, the movements leaders in fact 
sought to defend the deep inequalities of the department, particularly of land distribution, in the 
face of the leftist state.  
The divide between eastern lowlands and the western highlands was based upon long-
standing divisions. The collapse of the highlands’ silver and tin industries in the 1970s, along 
with the rise of mass agriculture led to a shift of economic power from the highlands to the 
lowlands. (Eaton 2007, 76) This furthered the production of “two different Bolivias”, divided 
between the poorer, largely indigenous highlands and the richer, primarily white and mestizaje 
lowlands. (Eaton, 19-20)  The CPSC produced a movement which depicted itself as being 
towards “democracy” and against the “tyranny” or “authoritarianism” of the central government. 
However, the autonomy movement has typically been characterized by scholars as a racially 
charged “backlash against indigenous mobilization,” (Eaton 2007, 71) drawing from “long-
standing regional divisions'' which have “solidified among the breakdown of the elite-led 
political party system” (Kirshner 2010, 108).  
The majority of studies on the Autonomy movement have focused on its components of 
ideology and identity construction, often interrogating the movement’s use of performative 
identity in order to achieve conservative political goals (Fabricant 2009; Gustafson 2006; 




Autonomy Movement, with their proliferation of “spectacularly performative and manifestly 
symbolic dimensions of culture”, are “post-materialist” movements. (Lowrey 2006. 65). While 
these studies provide important insights, I argue that in order to understand the autonomy 
movement’s profound implication on the course of Bolivia’s history, it is necessary to center the 
very material nature of the movement, which sought control land and nature. Thus, in this thesis, 
I argue that the autonomy movement should be considered as a political ecology movement, in 
which regional elites fomented a collective identity in order to defend their preferred socionature. 
The idea of socionature, as I use here, is borrowed from Swyngedouw, who insists that in 
order to transcend the binary formations of nature and society, we must develop a language 
which maintains the “dialectical unity of the process of change as embodied in the thing 
itself”(Swyngedouw 1999, 447). While the concept of “socionature” attempts to explain the 
essential basis which nature plays in the production of society, it does not go so far as to stray 
into environmental determinism. Rather, as Swyngedouw asserts, the production of socionature 
is tied up with social power, and “includes both material transformation and the proliferation of 
discursive and symbolic representations of nature” ( Swyngedouw 1999, 447).  Thus, the 
production of socionature transcends the material and also exists within the realm of scientific 
and political discourse, imaginaries, and meanings of nature (Swyngedouw 1999, 447).   
While political ecology has been widely used in the study of social movements, identity 
and natural resources in Bolivia, particularly with regard to the resource-based protests of the 
early 2000s “Gas Wars” and “Water Wars” which swept Morales to power, the Santa Cruz 
Autonomy movement has yet to be studied through a political ecology lens, owing in part to the 




scholarship in general. However, in my view, studying the Right through this lens offers 
important insights, revealing the fundamental socionatural contradictions within these projects. 
I assert that the defining socionatural relationship of Santa Cruz and its autonomy movement is 
that of monocultures. This refers, most obviously, to the monocultures of soy and other cash-
crops which have come to define the Santa Cruz landscape and economy. However, drawing 
from Shiva’s idea of ‘Monocultures of the Mind,’ I also consider how Santa Cruz has produced 
homogeneity in other ways. In her essay ‘Monocultures of the Mind’, Shiva asserts that 
“monocultures first inhabit the mind, and are then transferred to the ground. Monocultures of the 
mind generate models of production which destroy diversity and legitimize that destruction as 
progress, growth and improvement” (Shiva 1993, 7). The Santa Cruz autonomy movement, when 
studied through a lens of political ecology, demonstrates how monocultures of the mind and the 
land are contested and territorialized within states that are openly opposed to neoliberalism. 
 Santa Cruz Autonomy movement leaders argued that Morales went against the 
“moral constitution of Cruceño agriculture.” and threatened the “hard-fought-for, locally 
governed, politico-economic relations that have allowed the development of capitalist agriculture 
in Santa Cruz” (Valdivia 2010, 67). Indeed, central to the drive for autonomy is the legal control 
over land-tenure, which would allow agribusinesses to avoid national redistributive reform. 
Furthermore, greater regional control over the police would allow the region to enforce 
crackdowns on social movements that would threaten production -such as landless groups (Eaton 
2011, 294). Thus, embedded within the drive for autonomy is a radical demand for a different 
developmental model that would allow for the consolidation of the land and power in order to 




 Despite the MAS’s claim that the autonomy movement had been “defeated economically, 
politically and militarily” (Eaton 2017, 163), and the relative lack of scholarly attention to the 
autonomy movement after 2010, studying the Santa Cruz autonomy movement through the lens 
of political ecology demonstrates the movement’s essential successes in not only reproducing its 
system of monocultures, but extending the scope of its socionatural ideology to the national 
scale. I will argue that the structures and coalitions of Santa Cruz elites, agribusiness and the 
popular masses drawn together by the autonomy movement continued to seriously limit 
Morales’s process of change and push him a neoliberal direction. The 2010s were marked by 
numerous concessions from Morales to Santa Cruz, particularly to industrial agriculture, at the 
expense of land reform or environmental protection. Morales perceived neoliberal shift in the 
later years of his presidency was widely critiqued by the national and international left, however 
I argue that many critics overlook the fundamental importance that Santa Cruz elites and the 
autonomy movement played in redirecting Morales toward a more capitalist system. 
In reframing the Santa Cruz autonomy movement as a political ecology movement, I 
intend to uncover how processes of homogenization of the environment along with 
homogenization of people and knowledges are forms of violence which are intimately, and 
essentially, related. Processes which promote monoculture of the mind and land are often 
embedded in the state, however the autonomy movement demonstrates how processes of 
monoculture are contested and legitimated within sub-state spaces through right-wing social 
movements. I proceed with my interrogation of the Political ecology of the autonomy movement 
with three interrelated questions, which are more or less divided between my three chapters. 
First, how did the political ecology of monocultures and the ideologies of the Right come to 




felt and widely supported by diverse populations in Santa Cruz, allowing elites to maintain their 
territorial dominance? And Third; How were Santa Cruz elites able to rescale their power to the 
national level through alliances with Morales which allowed them to continue, and expand, their 
socionatural configuration? 
 
Background to  
 
The system of agriculture in Santa Cruz has heavily influenced its social relations, 
governance, economy and environment. Furthermore, as the agricultural hotspot of Bolivia, it 
has a powerful influence over the socionatural conditions of the country as a whole. The 
consolidation of land in the hands of a small elite through legal and extra-legal means resulted in 
an issue of landlessness which exists to this day. At best, agrarian elites have taken advantage of 
the desperation of the mass of landless peasants to supply cheap labor for their estates. At worst, 
elites maintained “semi-feudal” relations with indigenous inhabitants. Several hundred Guaraní 
families, an indigenous lowlands group, lived in conditions of “quasi-slavery” through debt-
peonage, coercion, or physical violence in Santa Cruz up through the 2000s (Kohl and Bresnahan 
2010, 8) . 
 Since the 1990s, Santa Cruz has seen a significant transition towards monopolizing, 
highly mechanized and capital-intensive commercial agriculture which has diminished the need 
for labor. This transition has seen the rise of monocultures of cash crops such as soy, which are 
produced for the global market rather than local consumption. The high production costs of soy, 
along with its value on the global market have increased the importance of international capital, 




(McKay and Colque 2016, 583). Developing Bolivia’s ’soy complex’ has relied upon 
‘productive exclusion.’ As fewer and fewer producers have the capital on hand to produce soy 
for the global market, small-scale producers are largely excluded from production (McKay and 
Colque 2016, 583). 
 Amid the autonomy movement, building support for a system which excluded so many 
while benefitting so few required creating a regional identity which was inclusive and vague.   
The Cruceño, or Camba, identity had been prominently discussed by Santa Cruz elites since the 
1950s, and was articulated by elites as a “special mestizaje.…. bored out of two noble razas. One 
side of the lineage is emblematized by the white Spanish conquistador, the other by the dusky 
tropical (not Andean) indigenous maiden,” attempting to purify the “primordial tension/ 
combination of Spaniard and Indian.” (Lowrey 2006, 66) This identity had historically been 
constructed in opposition to that of the highland “colla”, who was viewed as indigenous and 
premodern. However, during the autonomy movement, the regional discourse came to promote 
the Cruceño identity as something formed by space rather than race, in order to incorporate 
highland migrant and lowland indigenous constituencies. The identities constructed through the 
autonomy movement were profoundly successful in “obscuring ongoing power relations and 
unequal access to modes of production and resource wealth”(Fabricant 2013, 188), giving the 
movement the pretenses of an ethnic or populist movement while elites could reproduce 
 “regionalized territorial orders.” (Gustafson 2006, 352). Lowrey asserts:  “Bolivia is today 
wracked by an intense internal struggle over how to align the nation’s ‘two bodies’: its body 
politic (the citizenry and their institutions) and its natural body (the land and its resources). It is 
not surprising that arguments over geography, race, origins and essences are so heated at such a 




Autonomy serves as a goal which would allow Santa Cruz elites to defend the “moral 
constitution of Cruceño agriculture.”(Valdivia 2010, 67) which consists of forms of mass 
agriculture which exclude far more than they benefit. The popular support of this unequal system 
predicated on the “monoculture of the mind by making space for local alternatives disappear” 
while also destroying the “very conditions for alternatives to exist, very much like the 
introduction of monocultures destroying the very conditions for very conditions for diverse 
species to exist.”(Shiva 1993, 12)  
I emphasize, however, that the political ecology of the Santa Cruz elites is far from 
unique to the region; rather, it is an essential piece of the logic of the global Food Regime. “Food 
regime,” as I use here, comes from food regime analysis, a discipline introduced by Hariett 
Friedmann in 1987 and further developed by Friedmann and McMichael in 1988. Food regime 
analysis combines components of political economy, political ecology and historical analysis to 
explain how relations of food production and consumption have formed the basis of the nation-
state system and global capitalism since the 1800s. (Friedmann and McMichael 2008). The food 
regime concept historicizes the global food system without falling back onto a linear 
representation of agricultural “modernization,” , while emphasizing its foundational role in 
capital accumulation and geopolitical relations (McMichael 2009,140). The current food regime, 
defined by Giménez and Shattuck as the “corporate food regime,” arose in the 1980s and 
continues to the present. This food regime is characterized by globalized animal protein chains, 
the increasing significance of agri-fuels, and monopolistic control of the new agricultural “means 
of production” including genetically modified seeds, chemical inputs and technology which are 
almost exclusively produced in the Global North (Giménez and Shattuck 2011, 111). Like earlier 




accumulation in the global north. However the technologies, configurations and logics have 
encouraged accumulation of wealth like no food regime before it. Technologies which have been 
deemed “essential” for competitive production are monopolized by a handful of transnationals, 
ensuring that these corporations retain a significant share of the surplus from agriculture.  
The genius of the system is that is sustain itself; monoculture production, particularly of 
crops like soy, strips the soil of nutrients. Farmers become dependent on fertilizers. Deforestation 
from the expansion of the agricultural frontier reduce the ecosystem’s capacity to regulate insect 
populations, and pests take over crops. Farmers become dependent on pesticides. Farmers who 
rely on less technologically intensive agriculture are unable to compete with mechanized 
agriculture on the global market. The effects of climate change increasingly harm production 
through droughts and floods, pests and desertification, effects which are most strongly 
pronounced in the global south (Altieri and Pengue 2006, 15). Transnationals sell their 
genetically modified crops as solution to all of the ills affecting crop production. Entire national 
agricultures switch to Genetically Modified crops, becoming dependent on seeds whose entire 
genomes are patented. Once regions switch to GM crops, it is difficult or impossible to switch 
back; cross pollination of crops mean that farmers can be sued for selling seed which was 
incidentally cross-pollinated with the patented seed.  Meanwhile, with local markets flooded with 
cheap local and foreign foods produced by industrial agriculture, peasant farmers have increasing 
difficulty in marketing their surplus production. Peasants, along with farm workers displaced by 
mechanization of agriculture, are increasingly forced to move to urban areas in search of work, 
entering into the informal economy. With the urbanization of the global population, a greater 
food supply is needed from a smaller number of suppliers, encouraging the expansion of 




Despite claims that industrial agriculture has been necessary to feed the world’s growing 
population, Giménez and Shattuck and others assert that this food regime has also worsened 
hunger globally. Despite claims that Green Revolution technology and commercialized 
agriculture have alleviated global hunger, they point out that the number of hungry people on the 
planet has grown steadily from 700 million in 1986 to 800 million in 1998. The global food crisis 
arising in 2008, a symptom of the economic crisis not commonly discussed in the global north, 
caused the global number of hungry people to a historic 1.02 billion; more than 1/6th of the 
global population (Giménez and Shattuck 2011, 112.) 
Given the disastrous effects of the corporate food regime, it is logical that many countries 
in the global south have promoted national agricultural programs which attempt to retain national 
food sovereignty. However, the agents behind the corporate food regime have systemically 
weakened national sovereignty and forced the logic of monoculture on the global south. 
Neoliberal Structural Adjustment Programs of the 1980s broke down tariffs and price controls 
while also destroying national agricultural research by countries in the global south. The market 
component of the current food regime was cemented in the 1995 World Trade Organization 
“Agreement on Agriculture” (AoA) which restricted the rights of sovereign states to regulate the 
trade of agricultural goods (Giménez and Shattuck 2011, 111).  
In Latin America, production of soy has rapidly expanded since the 1980s, particularly 
across the Southern Cone countries of Chile, Argentina and Paraguay along with Brazil. The vast 
majority of Soy is not consumed as food, but rather is fed to cattle, used as agrofuel, or sold as 
derivatives which are used in processed food. Soy has a distinctly transnational supply chain, tied 
up in industries ranging from fuels (Biofuels), chemicals (preservatives) pharmaceuticals 




food manufacturing, where meat is the most valuable ingredient. (Friedmann and McMichael 
2008, 110) 
Latin American elites have come to see agro-industry as a tool for modernization 
throughout the country (Teubal 2009, 18), yet instead the effects have been profits for a few 
land-owning elites alongside massive dispossession and environmental harm. In South America, 
the “impoverished and impoverishing nature of monocultures”(Shiva 1993, 5) is readily on 
display. 
Across the border from Santa Cruz the vast state of Matto Grosso, Brazil is governed by 
longtime governor Blairo Maiggi, a right-wing agro-industry billionaire who has been called the 
“King of Soy.” (Newman 2019). Maiggi is emblematic of the increasing power of agroindustry 
in the Latin American right. The Latin American “New Right,” including figures like Brazilian 
president Jair Bolsonaro, have responded to this moment of profound social and ecological crisis 
through centering agro-expansionism and agro-extractivism in their visions of national progress, 
and responding to the resulting social contradictions through authoritarianism and violence.  
In the Santa Cruz autonomy movement, we can see how neocolonial elites engage in ideological 
and economic warfare in order to reterritorialize power and land in their favor. 
 Thus, I suggest that the spread of the food regime has not only increased the stratification of the 
global population- but numerous studies have also noted the deepening of class, gender and regional 
inequalities in the global south alongside the transformations of the Green revolution (Giménez and 
Shattuck 2011, 110-111). Its spread has also relied upon existing regional power groups such as those of 
Santa Cruz, which have maintained their dominance since the colonial era through dominating land and 




elites play an essential role for the transnational corporations of the food regime, who view Latin 
America’s vast amounts of land as a place to accrue profit without consequence. 
Whether explicitly or implicitly, the institutions and corporations of the food regime, mostly 
located in the Global North, encourage Latin American elites to wield their economic and 
political power to maintain sociospatial arrangements which allow the expansion of monoculture. 
 Thus, I suggest that the Autonomy movement not only as a regional attempt to maintain power, 
but part of a larger process which has happened across the continent and around the world. The 
transnational corporations, governments and institutions of food regime have formed alliances 
with elites and power groups in the global south, promising them the kind of limitless wealth and 
power of which they dream. 
Alongside waves of indigenous and peasant popular mobilizations of the pink-tide, right wing 
national elites have had to find new strategies to maintain systems of power. In Bolivia, we can see these 
new strategies of the right, and of the food regime, in action. In an era where overt authoritarianism is 
not as feasible a political option for the Latin American Right as it once was (Eaton 2007, 72), and US 
has shifted its strategy in Latin America to more “soft power” strategies rather than military 
interventionism (Garvey 2020), the maintenance of capitalism in the highly diverse and highly unequal 
region has posed challenges for national and international elites.  
The Santa Cruz Autonomy movement demonstrates how the right have taken strategies of 
wielding identity to contest and legitimate control over space from the playbook of left-wing movements 
and used these tactics to further their own goals.  In the case of Santa Cruz, centering identity in their 
movement was viewed as a way to conceal and maintain their system of monocultures, making 







The autonomy movement has framed itself as in defense of diversity against the centralizing 
impulse of the state. On the Santa Cruz government website, a quote from Cruceño Gustavo Pinto 
Mosquiera asserts “the right of a people or nation, like the Camba Nation to have freedom, autonomy 
from any state, is a natural, positive, rational and human right. No one can deny us the right to see, feel 
and understand ourselves differently in a diverse and heterogenous world…” (“Ideología Cruceña”, 
Santacruz.gob.bo; accessed 2021) However, as I argue here and throughout, the autonomy movement’s 
self-fashioning as being in defense a locally specific people and culture against the centralizing state in 
fact conceals its desire to destroy diversity, both of people and the environment, thus destroying local 
specificity. Thus, the Autonomy Movement’s attempts to materially and ideologically homogenize 
nature can be seen as part of a global process, carried out by interconnected agents of the food regime, in 
attempt to, as Shiva says,  “make diversity disappear from perception, and consequently the world” 
(Shiva 1993, 5). 
 
While the Latin American Right, often allied with agro-industry, will likely continue to 
use the precarity of this era to develop authoritarian control and claim that free markets and agro-
industry are the key to national development, this moment remains an opportunity for 
alternatives to be conceived and contested. 
 Bolivia is home to precious diversity of knowledge, culture and nature which are 
preserved nowhere else in the world. Filemón Escobar, mining leader and MAS founder asserted 




just of Andean-Amazonian culture but of the viability of its civilization.”(Kohl and Farthing 
2014, 15). This is not merely political rhetoric.  
 
“The people of the rural Andes present a seeming paradox. For over four hundred and fifty years 
they have been subjected to control by a succession of external rulers: European invaders, then 
European oriented, colonial elite classes, and finally Hispanicized national dominant classes. All 
of these have attempted to impose on the rural peoples of the Andes their own cultures and 
institutions, first those of Spain and then later those of the nascent republics of Ecuador, Peru, 
and Bolivia. Yet today, in spite of centuries of pressure from above, many Andean ethnic groups 
have maintained a way of life- or more specifically, symbolic configurations and complex modes 
of organization- which is derived from their Andean past and which distinguishes them from the 
Hispanicized world and of the “modern” classes inhabiting the towns and cities of the three 
countries. The continuities that characterize Andean rural life are not simply due to a lack of 
awareness of alternatives or to isolation from the national elites and the mechanisms of the 
state.”(Rasnake 1988, 4) 
 
At the basis of preservation of Andean civilization has been what Rene Zavaleto Mercado, one of 
Bolivia’s most important political theorists, calls “the characteristic mode of relation between 
man and nature”(Zavaleta Mercado 1986, 29); agriculture.  
Throughout the colonial period, the Spanish preserved the indirect rule system of the 
Inca, and by extension maintained the kin-based ayllu system of land distribution, governance 




remain untouched through colonial rule, despite domination by multiple foreign and national 
governments who imposed their “modernizing” logics.  
Thus, Zavaleta Mercado asserts; “A country is always what its agriculture is. Agriculture 
even today remains the characteristic mode of relation between man and nature, and even when it 
is said that industry predominates over agriculture, industry in fact functions in the service of this 
essential human activity.”(Zavaleto Mercado 1986, 29) 
 
These structures exist to this day. Based on the principle of regeneration and diversified systems of 
agriculture, Andean peasant agricultures push back against the globalizing logic of monocultures and 
demonstrate an example of locally specific, culturally appropriate and environmentally sustainable 
agricultures, which some scholars term Agroecology (Altieri, Nicholls and Montalba 2017, 1) 
While agroindustry dominates in the lowlands, alternative socionatures are imagined and 
enacted here as well. One prominent example of this is the Bolivian MST or landless peasant 
movement, which has drawn inspiration of the Ayllu system in constituting their own forms of 
redistributive, environmentally sustainable and locally specific agricultures on unused land. 
(Ezinna 2008).  
 Peasant agricultures throughout Bolivia offer locally based knowledges that are essential 
for overcoming the compounding disasters brought on by climate change and the massive 
dispossession and environmental damages of the global food regime. However in Bolivia, and 
around across Latin America, peasant agricultures are under attack. While Morales and the MAS 
came to power vocally supporting landless peasants and local agricultures, their increasing 
support of agroindustry following the autonomy movement has enabled monoculture to threaten 





As Zavaleta Mercado states; 
 
“”if the primary event [ in constituting society ] is the encounter between individuals and nature, then 
what is called a mode of production is already ‘a [determinate] mode of expressing their life, a 
determinate mode of life’, so ‘what they are, therefore, coincides with their production; both with what 
they produce and with how they produce’.”(Zavaleta Mercado 1986, 99). 
 
Mercado highlights the foundational role which agriculture plays in the mode of life of societies. 
As diverse environments, cultures and agricultures give way to vast monocultures, how we 
produce is becoming increasingly homogenized across the globe.  
The growth of agroindustry in Bolivia, predominantly pushed forward by the actors 
behind the Santa Cruz Autonomy movement, pose a threat to the diverse socionatures in Bolivia, 
and with that the diverse knowledges and cultures which maintain them. As Shiva says “The 
disappearance of diversity is also a disappearance of alternatives…. How often in contemporary 
times total uprooting of nature, technology , communities and entire civilization is justified on 
the grounds that ’there is no alternative’. Alternatives exist, but are excluded.” (Shiva 1993, 5). 
Central to Shiva’s argument ––- and my own ––- is the idea that diversity of knowledge 
and culture is fundamentally tied to diversity of the environment, and more specifically, diverse 
ways of transforming or interacting with nature.  Bolivia is a pertinent case study of this 
connection, both due to the importance of the nation’s natural resources, and because of the clash 
between the MAS’s decolonial project and the elites which cling on to colonial power structures 




globe, the MAS and the social movements which brought it to power demonstrate diverse ways 
about thinking about the environment which evade the “monoculture of the mind.” The vivir 
bien (living well) principle held by the MAS for example poses a powerful alternative to 
capitalist modernity, centering the reproduction of society and nature in a way which is “not only 
post capitalist… but also postsocialist.”(Colletta and Raftopolous 2020, 12). As such, it is 
important to understand the forces which seek to destroy them. 
 
Chapter Outline 
The following chapters will proceed in a manner which is fairly temporally linear, with 
inputs from different time periods if it is relevant to the topic of discussion. While these chapters 
are united by a running theme of political ecology, they each explore a different aspect of the 
conflict in Santa Cruz.  
 The Second chapter introduces my political ecology framework and tackles the question 
of how the political ecology of monocultures emerged in Santa Cruz. In other words, how did 
Santa Cruz’s unequal capitalist system develop while labor and indigeneity held much greater 
political power in the highlands? I point to two key elements of Santa Cruz’s socionatural 
history; the system of agriculture and, relatedly, the cultural and political dominance of white 
economic elites as maintained through the development of “cruceño institutionality”. While the 
cultural, political and socionatural differences between the highlands and lowlands are in part 
due to different natural landscapes and resources, I argue these differences are fundamentally 
tied to the forms of agriculture which have developed in the lowlands, their “determinate mode of 
life.”(Zavaleta Mercado 1986, 99), something which has been deeply influenced by international 




 The Third chapter undertakes the study of the Santa Cruz autonomy movement from 
2004-2009 through the lens of political ecology, asking how Santa Cruz elites were able to 
further the political ecology of monocultures throughout the department through the production 
of territory. I argue that the movement’s success was predicated on creating a homogenous 
regional identity (a monoculture of the mind) which was achieved through performance, material 
promises, control over space and violence.  the performativity was important as it legitimated the 
elites’ goals to international and national observers, however I argue that the shift to economic 
warfare through food shortages was the tactic which eventually allowed them to succeed, 
underscoring the importance of land and agriculture in both the movement’s goals and its tactics.  
 The Fourth chapter looks at the time period from 2010 until the present, analyzing the 
legacy of the autonomy movement on Bolivia’s socionature. While Morales has been widely 
criticized for his neoliberal shift, less understood is the massive role which the Santa Cruz elites 
and their autonomy movement played. Throughout the 2010’s, the central government’s 
concessions to Santa Cruz elites allowed these elites to maintain and further the socially and 
environmentally impoverishing practices which make up the “moral constitution of Cruceño 
agriculture.”  I argue that the Morales’ government series of alliances with Santa Cruz agro-
industry constituted a fundamental shift in the project of the MAS towards a project of 
monocultures, producing a “disappearance of alternatives” for the many Bolivians who imagine 
and enact alternative socionatural practices. 
In Chapter 5, my conclusion considers the implications of the new MAS government for 
the future of diversity in Bolivia.  I assert that the Santa Cruz Autonomy Movement played a key 
role in deepening “the impoverished and impoverishing nature of monocultures” (Shiva 1993, 5) 




produced rhetoric around regional specificity, its true goals were in producing regional 
homogeneity in order to fit into the global capitalist system, thus destroying local socionatures. 
 I draw from post-colonial theory and agro-ecology and argue that thinking beyond our current 
socio-ecological paradigm- and thinking beyond modernity- must center a diversity of 
knowledge and particularly the preservation of local socionatural relationships. I conclude that 
thinking beyond modernity, where “the market is the floor, but also the limit of social equality 
between people”(Quijano 2000, 217), must center true food sovereignty, not only of nations but 



















CHAPTER 2. THE POLITICAL ECOLOGY 
OF MONOCULTURES IN SANTA CRUZ, BOLIVIA 
Political ecology is a useful framework for studying Bolivia, where nature and natural 
resources have historically played central roles in politics and social movements. Bolivia is one 
of the world’s critical biodiversity hotspots and an essential carbon sink. It is the country with 
third largest share of the Amazon Basin (Kohl and Farthing 2014, 5). The country is also 
incredibly rich in natural resources, however, has historically been very poor. Resource 
extraction has typically benefited a few national elites and international corporations or 
governments. 
 While Bolivia is rarely seen as having played a central role in world history, the Spanish 
discovery of silver mines in the highlands city of Potosí in 1545 played a key role in the 
development of Spain’s mercantile capitalism during the colonial era. Potosí became “a symbol 
of the wealth of the world, surplus as magic.”(Zavaleta Mercado 1986, 32). According to Dussel, 
one of Latin America’s most important post-colonial theorists, the formation of Spain as the first 
“modern” nation depended principally on the wealth from the silver mines of Potosí (Dussel 
2000, 470). While treatment of indigenous peoples by colonial powers was devastating across 
the world, the treatment of indigenous people in  Potosí was especially brutal. Millions are 
thought to have died in the Potosí mines (Kohl 2012, 225) . Healey asserts; “Spanish 
Colonialism became entirely dependent on the super exploitation of indigenous labor for its 
mining and the agricultural production needed to support it” (Healey 2014, 87). The Spanish 
sough to replicate the Inca system of indirect rule, along with the kin-based ayllu structure of 




encomiendas, work units which were forces to provide labor for the colonizers (Healey 2014, 
87).   
 After national independence, Bolivia’s natural resources continued to largely benefit 
foreigners, along with a narrow band of national elite. Bolivia’s tin was essential to the US 
during  World War II, while its natural gas reserves, some of the largest on the continent, became 
dominated by multinational corporations amid neoliberal reforms of the 1980s (Kaup 2014, 
1839). This combination of factors has long led many Bolivians to feel that they have been 
unjustly robbed of their resources. As a result, natural resources play a key role in Bolivian social 
movements and politics, including the so called “gas wars” against the privatization of natural 
gas bringing Morales to power (Kohl and Farthing 2012, 225). Kohl and Farthing sum this up as 
“In the Bolivian imaginary, resources appear to be imbued with almost magical properties and 
have long been seen as possessing the potential to solve the country’s economic problems.” 
(Kohl and Farthing 2012, 226) They assert that the inordinate power of natural resources stems 
from the disparity between the country’s resource wealth along with the high prevalence of 
poverty. This disparity, coupled with a national memory of colonial and neo-colonial looting, 
they argue has served as “the most successful narrative over the past 60 years to mobilize the 
population to achieve pro-poor change.”(Kohl and Farthing 2012, 225)  
Despite the potentially unifying power of the resource nationalist frame, resource conflict 
has also caused numerous subnational conflicts (Kohl and Farthing 2012, 226), and regionalism 
plays an  important role in Bolivia. Bolivian scholar José Luis Roca stated in his 1979 book; 
“The history of Bolivia is not the history of class struggle. It is instead the history of regional 





While the resource nationalist movements concentrated in the highlands which brought 
Morales to power have been studied with a political ecology lens, considerably less attention has 
been given to the political ecology of the lowlands. 
In this chapter, I introduce Political Ecology and explain why it is a useful framework to 
understand the Santa Cruz autonomy movement. From there I delve into the history of Santa 
Cruz, and uncover how Santa Cruz’s socionature has been constituted, and how this lay the 
groundwork for the autonomy movement. 
 
Political Ecology Background 
 
Political ecology, more than being a specific discipline or theoretical framework or 
methodology, refers to a number of themes. These themes, according to McCarthy, include 
access to and control over resources, issues of marginality and identity, issues of scale and 
integration into international markets, property rights, livelihood issues along localized histories, 
culture and meanings around nature and natural resources. Many political ecology studies are 
situated in the Global South, meaning that the dynamics of colonial and post-colonial legacies 
are relevant. (McCarthy 2001, 1283)  
As political ecology is a theoretically diverse, multidisciplinary field, I specifically am 
borrowing the framework of McCarthy’s study on the Wise Use movement in the American 
West. McCarthy’s insights from studying a right wing, relatively pro-capitalist movement which 
is situated in the first world, all traits which are uncommon in political ecology studies, have 
been helpful for my understanding of Santa Cruz. The Wise Use movement defined itself as a 




and a supposedly distant federal government. Wise Use members claimed the right to use and 
occupy federal land however they pleased based on historical precedent and economic necessity. 
As such, their primary adversaries were the federal government and the environmentalists which 
sought to protect the land. The movement took on strong populist overtones and highly valued 
the right to self-determination. (McCarthy 2001, 1283) 
The Wise Use movement, much like the Santa Cruz autonomy movement, was based on a 
geographically bound identity with its own ‘moral economy.’ This idea of a moral economy, 
defined as an economy based on the idea of a shared set of moral values and norms within an in-
group, often arises as “defensive alternatives to capitalist modernity” (McCarthy 2001, 1290). 
However while moral economies can be alternatives to capitalist market relations, they also can 
defend certain accepted market relations. For example, members of the Wise Use movement 
sought to protect economic interests such as logging on federal lands, and losses of access to 
land were seen both as moral violations and economic losses (McCarthy 2001, 1291).  
The moral economy demonstrated by the Wise Use movement was “not about survival, 
redistribution or risk minimization, as most moral economies are,” but did offer a coherent Moral 
framework for the use of federal lands, consisting of the ideas that federal lands exist for the 
primary benefit of adjacent rural communities which supposedly rely on them. (McCarthy 2001, 
1291) While many authors have seen Moral economies as by definition precapitalist, McCarthy 
asserts that capitalist modernity involves ongoing struggles over nature, including “including 
ongoing resistance to the perennial dynamics of capitalism in the form of newly articulated moral 
economies.” (McCarthy 2001, 1291) As such moral economies such as that used by the Wise 




In Santa Cruz, elites seek to protect capitalist social relations through regional autonomy. 
However, a “moral economy” has formed in elites and non-elites alike, and was weilded as the 
basis of the autonomy movement. This ‘moral economy’ asserts that economic success of the 
department is beneficial to everyone regardless of class, even if the historical record of inequality 
within the department says otherwise. It also speaks to specific regional ideas of nature and how 
it should be used, which I argue is based on a Eurocentric, technocratic view of nature which is 
globally dominant. While imbued in a sense of regional tradition, the nature which Santa Cruz 
elites attempt to produce is fundamentally influenced by western ideology. 
Political ecology has been criticized for being “politics without ecology,” (Walker 2005, 
73) in that it is often concerned solely with political battles over land and resources with little 
focus on the role which nature plays in the production of society. In an attempt to remedy this, I 
find Swyngedouw’s development of the concept of “socionature” to be helpful. In historical 
materialist thought, nature simply provides the foundation from which society produces nature. 
However, Swyngedouw rebukes the notion that nature is simply “substratum for the unfolding of 
social relations.”(Swyngedouw 1999,446) He uses the term socionature do demonstrate the 
internal dialectic between nature and society, which he asserts are mutually constitutive. He 
states: “In brief, both society and nature are produced, and are hence malleable, transformable, 
and potentially transgressive” (Swyngedouw 1999, 447). In particular, I focus on the role of 
agriculture in the divergent development of Santa Cruz from Andean Bolivia, and relatedly, the 
development of the regional elite and their hegemony over the culture and politics of the region.  
While understanding the socioenvironmental ideologies and moral economies which have 
arisen in Santa Cruz is a central concern of mine, I also am concerned with how numerous scales 




neoliberalism and the food regime play out on broader scaled. My focus on agriculture in Santa 
Cruz necessitates an understanding of how environmental use and regulation occur at multiple 
scales. As Food Regime theory articulates, Agroindustry has been a key mode of market 
penetration in countries in the global south, along with a tool of geopolitical control.  
Thus while Swyngedouw’s view of nature and society being mutually constitutive is 
helpful, it’s essential to understand natures or societies as not merely being contained by, and 
constituted within the borders of a state or region. In order to avoid the “territorial trap,” I draw 
from regulation theory in my analysis of Santa Cruz. Regulation theory considers the ways that 
institutional configurations involving resource rights, conservation, social norms and 
environmental management “mediate the metabolic relationship between nature and society, and 
in so doing serve to stabilized environmental and social regulation within a given regime of 
accumulation” and thus respond to “social and ecological contradictions of capitalism.” 
(Perreault 2008, 151). Yet as “regimes of accumulation” are increasingly transnational, 
democratically elected local and state governments are increasingly disempowered to put into 
effect environmental policies which satisfy their constituencies. In more recent years, political 
ecologists have been concerned with the scales at which environmental governance operates and 
are contested, particularly as environmental governance has been widely rescaled amid 
neoliberalism. Thus, these theorists recognize that local environmental politics, imaginaries and 
“moral economies”, and state-level environmental policy and their outcomes are often limited or 
determined by international “institutional structures of late capitalism” (Perreault 2008, 152).  
The result has been in countries in the global south have limited ability to enact 
environmental policies. This is particularly true in countries like Bolivia with economies 




to flexibilization of not conceptions of sovereignty and citizenship (Ong 2004, 76), resulting in 
what she calls “graduated sovereignty.” (Ong 2004, 78) Graduated sovereignty describes how if 
“emerging countries” wish to be relevant in the global market, they must offer up certain state 
spaces, environments and peoples to the impact, and often harm, of the market. Even 
governments who do not embrace neoliberal ideology- she gives the example of the authoritarian 
governments of southeast Asia- must selectively embrace aspects of graduated sovereignty if 
they wish to be relevant to the global market (Ong 2004, 79). 
The case of the Santa Cruz demonstrates how neoliberalism finds strongholds in regions 
with elite dominance over space and nature. Yet the question remains; how did Santa Cruz 
become a stronghold of capitalism while socialist and indigenous values gained immense 
political currency in the highlands? 
 
A (Socio)Natural History of Santa Cruz, Bolivia 
 
Rene Zavaleto Mercado, one of Bolivia’s most influential political theorists, stated “A 
country is always what its agriculture is. Agriculture even today remains the characteristic mode 
of relation between man and nature, and even when it is said that industry predominates over 
agriculture, industry in fact functions in the service of this essential human activity.”(Zavaleto 
Mercado 1986, 29)  Yet while asserting that the environment is a significant element in the 
production of society, Zavaleto Mercado clarifies that it  is “the modification of the land and not 
the land itself, even if the land has determined its modification.”(Zavaleto Mercado 1986, 228) 
In this vein, in order to understand the set of institutional and social power relations in Santa 





Santa Cruz’s importance both ecologically and economically have made both its 
environmental and cultural or political changes subject to considerable international scholarly 
attention. However, these two components have rarely been brought into conversation. As I 
argue here and throughout, the history of Santa Cruz’s politics and economy cannot be told 
without its natural history and vice-versa. In the following section I will give a background to 
Santa Cruz’s history in order to explain how Santa Cruz’s sociosocionature has been produced.  
Santa Cruz’s socionature consists of concrete socio-environmental relations, as mediated 
through laws, institutions, economic processes and extralegal violence. However it also consists 
of knowledge, symbols and meanings of nature. The highly capitalist, unequal social relations of 
Santa Cruz and the connected environmental degradation are protected by a hegemonic 
knowledge system which posits reproduction of nature and society as secondary concerns to 
economic development. This has been proliferated through regional hegemonies, but also deeply 
influenced by international actors such as the World Bank who have imposed western values of 
nature through private property laws and forms of development which favor industrial 
agriculture. 
 While the Santa Cruz Autonomy movement can be seen as a movement of elites 
attempting to protect their interests from the central state, the Bolivian state that played the 
fundamental role in the formation of such regional elites, and the capitalist agriculture that 
enriches them (Valdivia 2010, 69). Santa Cruz was not always the economic powerhouse it is 
today. For the first half of the 20th century, Bolivia’s most valuable resources, tin and silver, 
were mined in the highlands while the lowlands were sparsely populated. A small group of 




isolation and lack of roads had prevented significant development in the region (Soruco, Plata 
and Medieros 2008, 57). The capital from the rubber boom was used by these elites in the 
consolidation of large-scale estates, where they used coerced labor to produce goods for regional 
markets (Eaton 2007, 73). These elites maintained “semi-feudal” relationships with lowlands 
indigenous people, upholding conditions of “quasi-slavery” through debt-peonage, coercion, or 
physical violence. Several hundred Guaraní families remained in these conditions until the 2000s  
 (Kohl and Bresnahan 2010, 8).  
Development initiatives created by the United States in the 1940s encouraged an 
expansion of the agricultural frontier in the lowlands, along with recommending the population 
be shifted ‘from the poor lands of the Altiplano to the fertile lands of the east.”(McKay and 
Colque 2015, 583). However significant change in the lowlands did not take place until the 
Bolivian Revolution of 1952, in which the revolutionary party, the MNR, attempted to integrate 
the remote region through increases in public spending and loan (Centellas 2016, 260). 
Contemporary patterns of land ownership in Santa Cruz trace back to the MNR’s Agrarian 
Reform Act of 1953, which redistributed land to a small number of indigenous peasants in the 
highlands, yet in the lowlands merely only opening up land to be consolidated. The then-sparsely 
populated lowlands were the target of “internal colonization” which promoted migration of the 
poor from the Altiplano to the lowlands through granting deeds to small plots of land to landless 
Andean campesinos. (Fabricant 2010, 92) Furthermore, it granted 500-50,000 acres to “capitalist 
entrepreneurs'', local elites with close ties to the political parties in power (Valdivia 2010, 69).  
This law, Bolivian scholars suggest, was a products of the modernist developmental ideologies 




the “feudal” colonial stage and eventually achieve socialism.  (Soruco, Plata and Medieros 2008, 
58) 
Thus, while the revolution broke up large-scale landholdings in the highlands and redistributed 
this land to peasants, along with offering incentives for peasants to resettle on unused lands in 
the lowlands, it primarily prioritized public investment in capitalist agriculture in the lowlands, 
while “leaving the indigenous communities to their fate” (Soruco, Plata and Medieros 2008, 61).   
 The MNR viewed the United States as strategic partners in their development of the 
lowlands. While the US had a strongly counter-revolutionary influence on Latin America at the 
time, the MNR viewed them as a country that would “finance the constitution of an agrarian 
bourgeoisie”(Soruco, Plata and Medieros 2008, 61). Plata argues that the Bolivian revolution 
was the only genuine social revolution to which the United States “provided early and steady 
support.” In the 1950s, Bolivia was the country to which the United States granted the second 
most economic aid per capita after Israel. Surprisingly given the radical land reforms produced 
by the Bolivian revolution (Eaton 2007, 73), the US proved itself “deeply committed to making 
the Bolivian revolution ‘work.’” (Soruco, Plata and Medieros 2008, 62-63). Central to this 
commitment was the idea that the US held that land distribution in the highlands was a means to 
the end of both reducing communist influence in the country and constructing an agro-industrial 
bourgeoisie (Soruco, Plata and Medieros 2008, 63). Between 1955 and 1960, the Bolivian state 
focused resources on the Inter-American Agricultural scheme, a U.S. funded agricultural 
research project which promoted mechanized, large-scale agricultural infrastructure in Santa 
Cruz. By and large, the elites who were viewed as partners in the development of agro-industry 
in the region were the same elites who had maintained power and privilege through controlling 




 Despite the MNR’s role in constituting the agrarian bourgeoisie, Santa Cruz elites felt 
threatened by the centralizing power of the socialist state, which had made departmental 
governments essentially powerless and nationalized extractive industries. Out of this concern, 
elites began constructing and reworking the regional “Cruceño” or “Camba” identity. In the late 
1950s, the new “Camba'' identity was born.  “A man of the people remarkable only for his 
relaxed, hospitable bonhomie, this new, mixed blood camba (like the old, indigenous camba) 
was no aristocrat. While he might not be lily-white, his parentage was nothing to be ashamed of 
– particularly when contrasted with a nearby alternative…”(Lowrey 2006, 68). The camba 
identity was contrasted to the highlands “colla” or “kolla,” a largely pejorative term to refer to 
Andean indigenous people  (Lowrey 2006, 68). 
In attempt to create an epic history for this regional identity, Santa Cruz elites began 
selectively appropriating aspects of lowland indigenous history and culture. In the 1950s, Santa 
Cruz’s scholars seized upon an obscure 1917 article by a Swedish ethnologist which described an 
encounter between the lowland Guaraní people and the Inca empire at the foothills of the Andes 
in the early 16th century. This essay was cast as proof of Guaraní ‘resistance’ to Andean 
expansion, by extension bolstering the narrative of the lowlands as being oppressed by the 
highlands. (Lowrey 2006, 29) 
The agrarian reforms of the MNR produced a “dual agrarian structure on the agricultural 
frontier” (Crabtree and Whitehead 2008, 19). The unequal land distribution between the Andean 
colonists and the large-scale producers of the lowlands (along with the central governments near 
total ignorance of lowland indigenous people) produced distinct agrarian classes. “Small 
producers” produced for the national market while “large producers” were oriented toward 




oligarchy in Santa Cruz and their organization around a number of non-governmental institutions 
marked the beginnings of “one of the country’s most important structural conflicts”(Crabtree and 
Whitehead 2008, 19) between the lowlands and the highlands.  
To carry forth their central development plan, the MNR essentially eliminated 
departmental governments. This gave rise to one of the most distinctive features of Santa Cruz 
society: the salience of the Comité Pro Santa Cruz (CPSC). The CPSC was founded by founder 
revolutionary, proto-fascist university students who used the civic committee to oppose 
redistributive policies of the MNR (Eaton 2007, 76). In the 1950s, their first project was 
defending the department’s claim to oil royalties, which they used to create a number of public 
services in the department, providing significant legitimacy for the group (Eaton 2017 146).  In 
absence of democratic departmental governments, the CPSC rapidly became a place where 
business and agriculture elites coalesced to defend their “regional interests” from the central 
government. While officially non-governmental and non-partisan, the CPSC has long been 
populated almost exclusively with white business elites, and affiliated with right-wing interests 
and groups, including the Unión Juvenil Crucenista (UJC) (Crucenista Youth Union), which still 
exists to this day and functions as what Eaton terms the “shock troops” of the CPSC (Eaton 2017 
146). As government existed exclusively at the state and municipal level, thus the unelected 
CPSC president emerged as department of Santa Cruz’s most powerful official, a status which 
the CPSC maintained long maintained through suppression of local elections (Eaton 2017, 
146).The CPSC forms the foundation of “la institucionalidad cruceña”, which refers to a number 
of affiliated private institutions which came to fill a number of governmental roles (Eaton 2017, 
147)., taking advantage of the weak capacity of the state to weave elite hegemony into the social 




 The MNR’s policies in agribusiness and centralization gave rise to conditions which 
facilitated the military dictatorship of Hugo Banzer, a cruceño himself, from 1971 to 1978.  
State-led capitalism under the military dictatorship of Banzer increased the power of Cruceño 
elites within their region and the nation as a whole, while furthering the divide between large and 
small-scale producers in Santa Cruz (Valdivia 2010, 69). Banzer benefited from close 
relationships with the agrarian elite and enriched them with more land. Between 1952 and 1996, 
55 million acres were distributed to a few thousand elite landowners while hundreds of 
thousands of campesinos existed on only 45 million acres (Fabricant 2010, 92). The growth of 
large-scale, export-oriented agriculture under Hugo Banzer resulted in a parallel increase in 
demand for labor. Workers largely came from the highland departments, which had high 
unemployment rates at the time due to the faltering mining industry. High labor demand in the 
lowlands resulted in a shift of the landless population from the highlands to the lowlands. By 
1976, 63% of salaried workers in Bolivia were located in the lowlands and 45% in the 
department of Santa Cruz (Valdivia 2010, 70). 
For elites, the growing economic power of the department justified the sense of racial and 
cultural supremacy over highlanders. The sense of difference from and superiority to highland 
Bolivia took on a geographic imaginary. Cruceño scholars argued that the foothills on the eastern 
flanks of the Bolivian Andes formed the “natural boundary” between the Highlands and 
lowlands. Many Cruceño scholars argued that the departments geography, along with its ethnic 
composition, made Santa Cruz more “naturally” alligned with Paraguay than Andean Bolivia 
(Lowrey 2006, 67). 
The idea of “natural” divisions between peoples that were developed to justify regional 




from Gramsci’s theory of hegemony, Valdivia asserts that hegemony is both produced and 
locatable in certain individuals and institutions, yet also relies on the majority’s coerced consent 
to inequality, which is produced and maintained through the creation of social classes. In Santa 
Cruz, agrarian classes were justified by “natural” cultural, racial and economic differences 
between the groups (Valdivia 2010, 68). Landless farm workers, many of which came from the 
highlands, were depicted as less hard working and economically astute as a justification for their 
lower social status  (Valdivia 2010, 68). 
 Kaup and others critiques the idea that the socioeconomic conditions of a region are 
solely created by transnational corporations and national elites without focus on the impact of 
labor. He argues that labor has played a significant role in shaping Andean Bolivia through the 
mining unions which formed a key constituency of the 1952 revolution and subsequent political 
ecology movements (Kaup 2014, 1836). The focus on labor highlights a key aspect of the 
divergent politics and forms of development in the highlands and lowlands. Industrial agriculture 
of Santa Cruz created conditions in which labor was relatively disempowered. With a large 
number of landless peasants that increased under the dictatorships of the 1970s and early 80s, 
farm workers were easily replaceable, while the spatially diffuse nature of farm labor made 
organizing difficult. The weakening of labor in the region increased during the neoliberal period, 
in which agriculture rapidly industrialized and made much agrarian work obsolete.  
 
Agrarian Change in the Neoliberal Era 
 
At the time of the First National Agricultural Census in 1950, 4 percent of all agricultural units 




agricultural census was taken, land distribution was even more unequal;  3.9 percent of all farm 
units were over 100 hectares in size and occupied 91 percent of all farm surface 
surveyed.”(Weisbrot and Sandoval 2008, 2) In 1985, in response to high fiscal deficits, the 
Bolivian government implemented the free market “New Economy'', opening production and 
services to foreign investors. This resulted in an influx of foreign capital, specifically from 
Argentina, Brazil and the US. The subsequent “internationalization” of the lowlands saw 
agrarian capitalists turning towards foreign investors rather than the state to support their 
production (Valdivia 2010, 71). 
Foreign investors further focused funds on large scale agricultural production, leaving 
smaller landowners increasingly marginalized. Beyond the opening of the lowlands to foreign 
capital, the neoliberal era also saw the increasing input of IFIs (International Financial 
Institutions) including the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund and the Inter-American 
Bank over the governance of nature. These IFIs promoted, nearly universally, deforestation and 
land appropriation in the pursuit of mass production of soy and other cash crops. Significantly, 
the World Bank’s Lowlands project financed new “areas of expansion” east of Santa Cruz, 
encouraging the appropriation and clearing of land used by the Ayoreo, Guaraní and Guarayos 
people, and facilitating the vertical integration of soy. USAID implemented the PL-480 program 
which promoted seed and technological improvements which reduced labor requirements. 
(Valdivia 2010, 71) 
Since the 1990s, Santa Cruz has seen a significant transition towards monopolizing, 
highly mechanized and capital-intensive commercial agriculture which has diminished need for 
labor. This transition has seen the rise of cash crops such as soy, which are produced for the 




value on the global market have increased the importance of international capital, leading to a 
‘foreignization’ of land along with a marginalization of small-scale producers. (McKay and 
Colque 2016, 583) This “neoliberal period” was marked by mass forest clearing across Latin 
America. Between 1990 and 2000, Bolivia lost an average of 270,400 hectares of forest per year 
or an average annual deforestation rate of 0.43 percent. Between 2000 and 2005, the rate of 
forest change increased to 0.45 percent per year.”(World Bank 1995, 6) 
 
 







Figure 2.2. Share of deforestation by crop, 1986-1992 (Data from McKay and Colque 2016). 
 
 
Figure 2.3. Area deforested in Santa Cruz by Agrarian Actor (Data from McKay and Colque 
2016) 
 
One of the most important factors behind deforestation in 1990’s in Santa Cruz was the 




attempted to increase agricultural export earnings through several objectives. First, lands east of 
the Rio Grande called “Expansion Zones” were sold to some large-scale landowners and many 
foreign landholders. Loans were provided to these landowners for machinery for land clearing, 
cultivation, harvest storage facilities and road improvements. Finally, barriers to export were 
dismantled through the regional trade blocs such as the Andean pact and the Common Market of 
the South (MERCOSUR) (Redo 2013, 70)  
 From 1990 to 2010, soybean production in Santa Cruz increased more than eight times, 
from 232,743 to 1,917,150 tons.  Furthermore, from 1990 to 2007, cultivated land in Santa Cruz 
increased five-fold from 413,320 to 1,821,631 hectares, nearly one million hectares of which was 
used for Soybeans (McKay and Colque 2015, 587). 
Soy production relies on heavy external inputs, thus heavy capital investment. The 
pesticides and fertilizers, genetically modified seeds, heavily machinery, along with storage and 
processing facilities are increasingly concentrated in the hands of few international corporations. 
Furthermore, it requires significant investment from the farmer (McKay and Colque 2015, 585). 
The implications of this in Santa Cruz is that the small and medium-sized farmers who often got 
land through government redistributive reforms, are pushed out of the market by the more 
valuable soy, and many are forced to rent out their land to large-scale landowners with the 
capital to invest in soy  (McKay and Colque 2015, 585). To this day, the concentration of land in 
Bolivia among a very small group of landowners is among the most unequal in the entire world, 
only exceeded in Latin America by Chile (Weisbrot and Sandoval 2008, 4). 
 While neoliberal policies have been rightfully blamed for the agrarian transformation, 
these macro-level influences were enacted through local actors. As Redo asserts, individual 




cultural values, personal knowledge, and local norms (Redo 2013, 69). Indeed, that the logic of 
monocultures and agroindustry were accepted in Santa Cruz depended not only on neoliberal 
policies, but also locally specific ideologies, hierarchies, and socionatures. In Santa Cruz, the 
neoliberal logic of agroindustry and modernization rested upon a much older “Darwinian logic” 
which had promoted white supremacy of indigenous people since colonial times (Soruco, Plata 
and Medieros 2008, 102). Crabtree and Whitehead argue that in Bolivia, racialized hierarchies 
have changed over time, through different modes of government. While during the colonial 
period, Spanish asserted their supremacy with appeals to religion (“God was on the Spaniard’s 
side.”), the first century of the republic shifted towards “scientific” appeals to Social Darwinism 
(Crabtree and Whitehead 2008, 18). The method of determining hierarchy, I argue, shifted again 
in the post-revolution period in Santa Cruz, in which ideas of social Darwinism mixed with 
burgeoning neoliberal logics of productivity and modernity. The Santa Cruz elites came to see 
themselves as exemplars of modernity, while the inequalities in their department were chalked 
up to natural differences, particularly between so-called Cambas and Kollas. They bolstered their 
defense of their system of agriculture with neoliberal logic that large-scale, monocultural 
production is the most efficient and profitable use of land.  
 Santa Cruz elites have come to see themselves as self-made entrepreneurs who are 
subjugated by the centralist state. However, Weisbrot and Sandoval challenge this notion, noting 
that Santa Cruz agrarian elites have benefited from  significant subsidies for diesel fuel, which is 
necessary for farmers to transport their crops. This diesel subsidy makes up 6% of Bolivia’s 
federal budget, 40% of which ( about $135 million ) goes to Santa Cruz. (Weisbrot and Sandoval 
2008, 5) In 2008, the Finance ministry announced that they were considering the possibility of 




were motivated to advocate for autonomy  “not only to prevent land reform directly, but to 
ensure that the provincial government would continue to subsidize their production even if these 
subsidies were found, on economic grounds, to be wasteful, inefficient, and/or regressive in 
terms of income redistribution.”(Weisbrot and Sandoval 2008, 5)  
 While during the neoliberal period Santa Cruz elites had little to complain about 
economically, they felt indignant about their lack of political power in the central government 
following Bolivia’s return to democracy. While Santa Cruz had little reason to pursue total 
autonomy due to the benefits they received from the central government, the CPSC began 
organizing autonomy protests in the 1980s in order to demand greater power for their 
department. On February 26, 1986, the first gran cabildo (large council) took place at the foot of 
the statue of Christ the Redeemer in downtown Santa Cruz, where many later autonomy protests 
would take place. The “solemn act” was described as an “Oath to Santa Cruz and autonomy.” 
Framed as an oath to God, the Oath stated “Do you swear by God, by Santa Cruz…. to fight to 
preserve our moral values against crime and drug trafficking, seeking by all means justice, 
freedom and the consolidation of our regional identity? Do you swear by God and by Santa Cruz: 
Fight for our autonomy, that for justice and history will correspond to us?”(Daboub Arrien, “The 
Pajutú Revolution”; accessed 2021). 
 This act was only attended by a few thousand people, however its rhetoric served as a 
precursor for the autonomy protests of the 2000s, demonstrating the elite-based regional identity 
and ideology which was gaining power in the region  
 




 The history of Santa Cruz from the 1950s through the neoliberal period demonstrates the 
significant role which the state played in developing monocultures in the department, both in terms of 
encouraging the development of agroindustry, and through indirectly allowing the development the 
Cruceño “monoculture of the mind” produced by elite dominated, non-democratic political system of 
non-governmental institutions. Santa Cruz’s developments during this period, however, followed 
broader trends of the food regime and neoliberalism which limited the ability of states to carry out their 
own forms of agricultural development.  Across Latin America, the rise of neoliberalism and the 
modernization process harmed the political power of land-related issues, while bolstering agro-industry 
and property rights of large landowners. Neoliberalism has undone many of the agrarian reforms of the 
20th century which protected small and medium producers, rural workers, indigenous communities and 
the environment. Since the early 90s, almost all Latin American countries have “freed” or “flexibilized” 
their agrarian institutions to promote the treatment of the land as a commodity  (Teubal 2009, 10).  
 The soil of Santa Cruz is naturally fertile, but it has been impoverished over years 
of monocultures. Soy can only be grown in a monoculture for so many years before irreparably 
diminishing the soil. Because of this, the input of capital towards the fertilizers, pesticides and 
machinery required for profitable soy production is significant. Soy’s capital intensive, labor 
disperse nature along with its ability to diminish over time makes soy act similarly to an 
extractive resource. Much like extractive resources like oil and natural gas, the production of soy 
benefits few while having wider ecologically and socially degrading impacts. Furthermore, it 
promises only short-term profits, with limited potential for sustainable and socially responsible 
development in Santa Cruz (Soruco, Plata and Medieros 2008, 75). Soruco, Plata and Medieros, 
scholars at the Tierra institute in Eastern Bolivia assert “the Cruceño Development model” has 




families”(Soruco, Plata and Medieros 2008, 79).  For Santa Cruz elites, this does not matter. As 
Shiva asserts: “Monocultures spread not because they produce more, but because they control 
more. The expansion of monocultures has more to do with politics and power than with 
enriching and enhancing systems of biological production”(Shiva 1993, 7).  
Despite the elite hegemony in Santa Cruz, alternatives socionatural imaginaries exist in 
the department. A prominent example is the Bolivian MST, or landless peasant movement, 
which employs diversified and collective models of agriculture on unused land. Ezinna describes 
visiting an MST settlement which was created in 2000. Los Sotos was taken over by around 75 
landless Bolivians who had worked for years on large haciendas and banded together to take 
over 1000 hectares. The land had been abandoned after being stripped for lumber and when the 
settlers arrived, the soil was barren. Ezinna notes that the soil at Los Sotos was rich, richer than 
soil he had seen anywhere else in the region. The settlers grew corn, wheat, soy and potatoes 
along with rearing livestock. Labor was shared and so was the money earned from sales, which 
was completely shared between the settlers. (Ezinna 2008, 220) At the time of writing, in 2008, 
Ezinna states there were over 100 similar MST settlements in Bolivia, all of which followed a 
similar collective model and nearly of which had experienced violence at the hand of 
paramilitaries sent by local landowners (Ezinna 2008, 220). 
Violence against the landless goes beyond defense of property; Ezinna points out the 
important fact that landless peasants are a key source of labor for large landowners; “The fact 
that poor landless peasants are the backbone of the export economy does not escape the attention 
of the latifundistas, who recognize the threat squatter exoduses pose to their labor supply. When 




unite to attack these settlements, irrespective of whether or not it is their land that is being 
occupied.”( Ezinna 2008, 226) 
In the following chapters, I hope not only to demonstrate the ways in which monocultures 
have been embedded and fought for in Santa Cruz, but to fight against the “disappearance of 
alternatives” created by monocultures of the mind (Shiva 1993, 5) by highlighting alternative 
ways of thinking which produce divergent visions for the future.  
As I have argued in this chapter, the history of Santa Cruz and its agriculture reveals how 
the autonomy movement was in fact over uses and meanings of land and nature. While the 
agrarian elites fomented support for autonomy to defend their economic interests, many ordinary 
people also participated in the movement. Some saw the movement as a way to maintain regional 
dominance over national affairs and, perhaps less consciously, to re-assert racial supremacy in a 
moment of historical reckoning. Yet others, including lowlands indigenous groups and peasants, 
saw regional autonomy as a way to further material interests as the central state had historically 
ignored them. This leaves the question of how this movement drew together such disparate 
groups and found support among a majority within Santa Cruz. In my next chapter I will look 






CHAPTER 3.  TERRITORY, IDENTITY AND RACISM  
IN THE SANTA CRUZ AUTONOMY MOVEMENT 
 
As established in the previous chapter, the Santa Cruz Autonomy movement arose from a 
system of interrelated institutions and practices of control over land and nature which are woven 
into the fabric of Santa Cruz’s socionature. In this chapter, I turn to the period of time between 
2004 and 2010 in which the autonomy movement was most active, focusing on the role of 
territory in the movement’s rhetoric and goals.  
Latin America has experienced widespread internal political instability since the 
nationalist period, however the region also boasts a remarkable continuity of states and their 
territories. While Europe and other continents feature nationalist and separatist conflicts which 
periodically alter the political map, Latin America countries have remained largely the same 
since the national independence.  (Mitre 2014, 3). While the external composition of Latin 
American states has remained largely unchanged, in the last several decades, Latin America has 
seen an explosion of territorial and regional movements in which groups vie for greater territorial 
control at the sub-state level (Bryan 2012), along with neoliberal decentralizing reforms 
implemented by the state which cast state responsibilities to sub-state regions (Falleti 2010). 
 The Santa Cruz autonomy movement sits somewhere in between these two forms of 
decentralization, both wielding the rhetoric of peoplehood and self-determination of indigenous 
territorial movements, while also pursuing free market capitalist goals of neoliberal 
decentralization. Eaton describes how a similar Regional autonomy movement like that in Santa 




of “conservative autonomy movement” (Eaton 2011, 291). However the success on the regional 
and national scale of the autonomy movement puts it in a category of its own.  
Using the tools of political ecology reveals how the actors behind the Autonomy 
movement were deeply concerned with control over space, nature, and resources, and how they 
were able to effectively achieve these goals.. In this chapter I reveal how Santa Cruz elites were 
able to maintain their spatial configuration of monocultures in the face of the redistributive state, 
and effectively moderate the environmental and social visions of Morales and the MAS.  While I 
look at the framing and tactics of the movement, I consider more deeply what these frames hid in 
the context of environmental change, economic practices and social conditions. My central 
questions are the following; how were Santa Cruz elites able to create regional consensus over 
the project of autonomy in a relatively short period of time- and how were these elites able to 
maintain their preferred socionature of monocultures. I conclude that the profound success of this 
movement was rooted in the region’s status as the nation’s food producer, emphasizing the 
essential role which agriculture plays in influencing the direction of state development and 
socionatural governance. 
 
Rise of the Autonomy Movement 
The autonomy movement began slightly before Morales' election, in response to 
contentious counter-neoliberal protests in the highlands. Neoliberal president Sánchez de Losada 
was unable to quell the mass protests against neoliberal reforms which are now known as the 
“gas wars.” Following police repression which left dozens of protesters dead, de Losada 
resigned, and Santa Cruz elites feared the indigenous and peasant movements in the highlands 




whether Santa Cruz would stay within Bolivia.”(Eaton 2017, 152)  A similarly neoliberal 
president Carlos Mesa took office in 2003, while not being a radical, was the first president in 
decades without direct ties to Santa Cruz’s elites, which made the CPSC fear that he may side 
with the indigenous mobilizations in the highlands. (Centellas 2016, 24) 
More radical, rightist elites in lowlands had already begun the “Camba Nation'' 
movement, which started in 2001. The “Camba Nation '' threatened secession from the Andean 
majority indigenous part of the country, claiming a “right to self-determination” for an implicitly 
white population. The Camba Nation presents itself  “as progressive, modern, productive, in 
favor of globalization, in contrast to the collas of the western highlands, which are presented as 
conservative, backward, unproductive (if not parasites) and globalphobic ... '' affirming its 
regional economy and culture as proof of its nationhood (Soruco, Plata and Medieros 2008, 143). 
Arising in the academic segments of the Santa Cruz elite, the Camba Nation “Far from being a 
plural and critical debate of the subject” and the autonomy debate rapidly became “radical and 
closed in defense of autonomy.”  In this case the intellectual class supported the interests of the 
elite class and represented this subjectivity.(Soruco, Plata and Medieros 2008, 149-150) 
 While mastering the language of sovereignty and cultural rights used in indigenous 
autonomy and territorial movements in Latin America’s ‘territorial turn’ (Bryan 2012) the 
Camba Nation movement sought to defend the capitalist system rather than gain refuge from it. 
While the autonomy movement cast itself as a moderate alternative to the secessionist, more 
radical Camba movement, the Camba countermovement was far from a fringe movement. 
Lowrey calls this movement “the contemporary autonomy movement...most immediately 




The membership of the two movement organizations overlaps. Carlos Dabdoub, a 
founding member of the Camba nation, was also a member of the CPSC and a member of ’ 
administration (Soruco, Plata and Medieros 2008, 145). Furthermore, some of the key ideas that 
were theorized by the Camba Nations were operationalized by the CPSC. These ideas include the 
autonomic referendum and the concept of the “Media Luna” (Made of the departments of Santa 









A central theme of this discourse was a claim that the centralist state had long inhibited 
the development of Santa Cruz, ignoring the central developmental role the state played in 
constitution the agro-industrial bourgeoisie in Santa Cruz (Soruco, Plata and Medieros 2008, 84). 
Drawing from this growing autonomist sentiment, In June 2004 the CPSC held a public 
rally for ‘autonomy and work’ at the foot of a large statue of Christ in downtown Santa Cruz 
(Fig. 1). 50,000 people attended the rally, which included a speech from CPSC president ( and 
later, governor ) Rubén Costas which discussed autonomy (Centellas 2016, 247). The president 
before Morales did not approve the autonomy referendum, thus the CPSC organized protests to 
legitimize their formation of a Pre-Autonomic Council, which began in 2004 (Centellas 2016, 
249). The second cabildo, which drew 350,000 people, led President Mesa to issue a decree 
which would allow the department to elect a governor for the first time. Rubén Costas stepped 
down from his position as the president of the CPSC and won the December 2005 election- and 
was later re-elected in 2010 and 2015 (Centellas 2016, 249). This marked the beginning of the 
department as a meaningful level of governance, in the case of Santa Cruz, with considerable 
congruence with the private institutions and elites which had long dominated Santa Cruz society.  
According to Political Opportunity theory, social movement strategies are influenced by 
how “open” or “closed” the political structures are to input. Movements in “open” systems 
largely work within the institutions of the state, whereas movements in “closed” systems use 
more confrontational strategies (McAdam et. al 1996, 44). When the MAS was elected in 2005 
as the first majority government in decades, Santa Cruz elites feared that this would allow the 
MAS to pass many of their redistributive reforms (Fabricant and Postero 2013, 193-194). In this 
case, the relative closure of the state to the demands of the Santa Cruz elite seemingly influenced 




institutions, and the newly empowered regional government allowed elites to produce their own 
Political Opportunity structure, blocking out space for other, counter-autonomy movements to 
form. Morales started his presidency with harsh measures against the Santa Cruz institutionality 
which threatened his political project. In 2007, Morales imposed a 70% cut in hydrocarbon 
 
Figure 3.2. Pro-autonomy protests in Santa Cruz, 2000–2010. Source: Flesken, 2018; 
https://doi.org/10.1177/0263395717697343 
 
rent-sharing with producer departments, resulting in mass protests in Santa Cruz. Morales also 
threatened to nationalize three Santa Cruz cooperatives to lower the prices of public services and 
drove 30 Santa Cruz business or civic leaders for financing a plot to overthrow Morales. Leaders 
of the autonomy movement saw these arrests as proof of political persecution. (Eaton 2017, 158) 
 From 2006 to 2009, the autonomy movement closely corresponded to the status of 




draft of the constitution, massive and violent protests broke out in the city of Santa Cruz, 
resulting in negotiations and concessions. The government agreed to departmental legislatures 
which would give departments greater power to make laws. Second, Morales agreed to readopt 
bicameralism, leaving space in the Senate for opposition. (Eaton 2017, 160) 
 Protests included work stoppages, hunger strikes and demonstrations, all leading up to an 
illegal referendum on autonomy in 2008 which passed with 86% of the vote. (Eaton 2017, 157) 
The Santa Cruz autonomy movement can be seen as a dual process between a popular 
social movement, and a hegemonic drive for power orchestrated by elite institutions and actors. 
While Santa Cruz elites could (and attempted to) seize power through violence- such as they did 
in a 2008 coup attempt (Eaton 165)- their most successful strategy used the popular movement 
for autonomy to legitimize their position while wielding their economic power and growing 
institutional power against the government. 
Themes of democracy and human rights were common at autonomy protests. The large 
gatherings, which continue to take place in Santa Cruz, are called “gran cabildos”, meaning 
"large council” or a public deliberative assembly (Centellas 2016, 249). Human rights frames 
were acted out through embodied forms of protest such as hunger strikes, which took place in the 
colonial plaza in Santa Cruz in 2006 and 2008 in response to proposed reforms from Morales. 
One elite woman participating in a 2006 hunger strike, a member of the Comite Civico 
Femenino, the women’s counterpart to the CPSC, stated; “We have taken this stance 
individually, in order to defend democracy, in order to defend citizen rights, in favor of justice 
and to live in peace” (Fabricant and Postero 2013, 188). In other protests, victimization was 
acted out through protestors lying in coffins draped with the Santa Cruz flag, and a Cruceña 




Cruceño protestors dressing as rural peasantry or indigenous people, have furthered a sense of 
collective identity and created a sense of legitimacy. Past sources of governmental legitimacy, 
such as the divine will of God or ability to provide material welfare, are at odds with the 
neoliberal conceptions of state, thus rhetoric about human rights and indigeneity have become 
essential to state-building, along with claims to resources and land. (Van Cott 2000, 6).   
The social movement aspect is more visible and thus has been more extensively studied, 
however these processes are inextricably linked. The CPSC and Santa Cruz government, while 
initially lacking political power, expanded their influence over the region and the country 
through wielding their economic power and control over space. Yet their continued hegemony 
was fragile and depended on the popular, and visible, support of cruceños. Conversely, while 
regional sentiment was fomented by elites, it was received and interpreted by the population, 
who had diverse goals in their support (or lack of support) for autonomy. Centellas asserts ““an 
exclusive focus on the role of CPSC in the Santa Cruz autonomy movement refuses to recognize 
the agency of individuals or organizations not affiliated to (and perhaps even antagonistic to) the 
CPSC but who also participate in the broader demand for regional autonomy.” (Centellas 2015, 
252) 
The Autonomy movement has been conceptualized in several ways, ranging from a tactic 
for an elite backlash towards indigenous politics (Gustafson 2006), as a social movement (mass 
mobilization from below) or as a populist movement (mass mobilization from above) (Peña 
Claros 2006). Others argue that it must be studied as an ethnic or identity-based movement, 
emphasizing the way the “camba” identity has come to be deeply felt by many lowlanders.  
(Centellas 2015, 247 Other consider the movement as a fight over resource control (Weisbrot 




assert that the more radical arm of the movement, the Camba Nation is a white separatist 
movement (Lowrey 2006).  
Each of these lenses offers something to the study of this movement. I am studying the 
movement through the lens of political ecology because; 1. It allows a more plural understanding 
of the movement, neither as being completely orchestrated by institutions nor as a spontaneous 
revolt against centralism; 2 it highlights the important role which land and territorialization play 
in the movement; and 3. It refocuses study towards the material and socionatural consequences 




Vandergeest and Peluso define territory as the “abstract and homogeneous space” from 
which modern states derive and enact their power. (Vandergeest and Peluso 1995, 386) However 
territory and its control are not limited to the state. Rather, territoriality can describe any "attempt 
by an individual or group to affect, influence, or control people, phenomena, and relationships by 
delimiting and asserting control over a geographic area." (Vandergeest and Peluso 1995, 387-
388) 
As established in the previous chapter, elites in Santa Cruz have long maintained their 
power through establishing control over territory. While the departmental government of Santa 
Cruz held little power before the 2000s, elites predominantly in the city of Santa Cruz defended 
the socionatural relations of Santa Cruz through a series of state-like private institutions and 




 Territorialization, Vandergeest and Peluso assert ““is about excluding or including people 
within particular geographic boundaries, and about controlling what people do and their access to 
natural resources within those boundaries.”(Vandergeest and Peluso 1995, 388) The 
territorialization of Santa Cruz by the Bolivian state occurred partially through the National 
Revolution of 1952, however the weak capacity of the central government made space for Santa 
Cruz elites to enact their own forms of territorialization and maintain the unequal distribution of 
land which they profited from.  
The territoriality of states is based on abstract space. Abstract space is space which can be 
divided into discrete units. Abstract space is “homogenous in that it is represented as uniform 
within any given territory” and is visualized through mapping. This allows the state and 
economy to visualize and enact power over space, which is imagined as discrete plots of private 
and state property. (Vandergeest and Peluso 1995, 388) However, “People do not experience 
space as abstract,” producing a conflict between these two spatial realms (Vandergeest and 
Peluso 1995, 389)  
In a similar manner, Lefebvre identifies the “essential spatial contradiction of society” as 
the conflict between abstract space, which includes “the externalization of economic and 
political practices originating with the capitalist class and the state” and social space, or concrete 
space, which is the material space of “use values” which is interacted with by all classes (Miller 
2000, 11). This tension is expressed through “the colonization of everyday life [through] the 
superimposition and hyperextension of abstract space” (Miller 2000, 13).  
This “essential spatial contradiction” was a tension which Santa Cruz autonomy 
movement leaders had to overcome in their attempt to gain popular support. In the 1970s and 




of the term ‘camba’, which was previously used as a pejorative towards indigenous peasantry 
and began using it as a regional signifier. In doing so, they created their own regional mestizaje, 
a commonly used tool of nation-building. This ‘camba’ identity, seen as being of Spanish and 
lowland indigenous descent, was contrasted to the ‘colla’ identity, descended from Incas 
(Flesken 2018 54). 
 The assertion of a cultural identity to produce claim to territory reflects tactics of 
indigenous movements which arose in the 1990s (Bryan 2016). Lowrey sums this up well: 
 
“Across the short space of a decade (the 1990s), the rhetoric of rights grounded in origins and 
essences has slipped out of history and into geography. On this new terrain it is wielded at least 
as well by Bolivian whites as by Bolivian Indians.” (Lowrey 2006, 65) 
 
Much like the process of state-building, territory-building is facilitated through the 
development of a mythologized past, present, and future which produces a notion of a “people” 
with unique claims to a designated land and the resources within it. In order to produce a claim 
towards space, territorial movements emphasize relationships between people and land, often 
relying on a mythologized heartland and peasant. These mythologized “traditional” socionatures, 
which have often been disrupted by global capitalism, are central in constructing a vision of a 
territorial future based upon an idealized past. Alonso asserts that the modern state system, along 
with capitalist organization, have depended on the “homogenizing, rationalizing and partitioning 
of space,”(Alonso 1994, 382) along with the production of “homogenous, empty time,” which 
allow the state to depict itself as a cohesive community moving through history (Alonso 1994, 




with one another to proliferate a sort of nationalism which arose with the Camba Nation 
movement but was adapted into the more “moderate” drive for autonomy.  
The Santa Cruz government website prominently features Autonómica, “autonomy” as 
one of its major sections. Subsections include “history,” “regional debate,” “Building 
Autonomy,” “departmental dialogue,” “democratic values,” and “Cruceño ideology.” The history 
section tells a story of the cruceño people fighting against the centralism of upper Peru and later 
the state of Bolivia for 450 years (Santa Cruz.gob.bo; accessed 2021). 
The section “Ideología Cruceña” (Cruceño Ideology) asserts that the autonomist project 
is rooted in the culture and geography of the lowlands. It asserts that the Cruceño identity “is 
vividly felt, not by an enthusiastic minority” who desire to “preserve their individuality and 
ensure their permanence and development” in the face of the centralist state. This ideology 
argues that Bolivia as a “centralist, arbitrary and inefficient state that governed such a 
heterogeneous country” and that centralism is not a work of chance but “an endemic evil deeply 
entrenched in the brain of the Bolivian politician” (“Ideología Cruceña”, Santacruz.gob.bo; 
accessed 2021)  The section outlines the territorial identity of Cruceños, the “people of the 
plains,” as rooted in the geography and history of Santa Cruz; 
 
“The roots of this revolution for 'change' are centuries old. It begins with the native cultures of 
these vast plains that always walked in search of free territories, where they did not exist. ‘evil’, 
creating an indomitable spirit ready to face adversity and seize the few opportunities in 
peacetime. The Spaniards who came to these lands came from a long war of seven centuries; 
They also dreamed of a generous land to reproduce their culture and way of life, to generate 




time, merged into one, emerging a mentality of women and men who fight for peace, fraternity 
and freedom.” (“Ideología Cruceña”, Santacruz.gob.bo; accessed 2021) 
 
This excerpt places the present conflict in a mythologized history of Santa Cruz, 
emphasizing the Spanish and indigenous influences on the regional culture. This rhetoric evokes 
the cruceño as a frontiersman oppressed by the governing of a distant state, drawing attention to 
both the “generous lands” and the cultures of freedom which formed the regional identity. 
Alonso asserts the link between “people, heritage, territory, and state” is facilitated through 
natural metaphors and imagery, some of which depict the nation as a “grand genealogical tree, 
rooted in the soil that nourishes it.” These metaphors evoke limited membership, sovereignty, 
and temporal continuity (Alonso 1994, 383-84). An excerpt of Camba Nation founder Dabdoub’s 
book on the website asserts “This is how the seed of autonomy germinated and today it is a leafy 
tree that provides shade and shelter to all the peoples that occupy almost two-thirds of the 
national territory.” (Dabdoub, “The Pajutú Revolution” Santa Cruz.gob.bo accessed 2021) The 
sense of racial and geographic superiority of regional elites can even be seen in its white-and-
green flag. In Santa Cruz schools, it is taught that green symbolizes the natural riches of the 
region, while the white celebrates purity of lineage and nobility. (Gustafson 2006, 356)  
 
Building Santa Cruz’s Monoculture of the Mind 
While racist and elitist rhetoric remained prevalent in the autonomy movement, building 
popular support required reaching beyond the CPSC’s existing base of support. The “essential 
spatial contradiction” loomed large in Santa Cruz, with its deeply unequal distribution of land 




identifies 3 non-elite sectors which it was crucial for the CPSC to win over: “Workers, 
indigenous groups and migrants” (Eaton 2017,154).  
Movement leaders attempted to produce a homogenous regional identity using populist 
tactics. Laclau considers populism a tactic used by a dominated group to form coalitions with 
subaltern groups on class-neutral terrain. He asserts that this typically occurs through 
constructing a common identity- a shared understanding of “the people,” which is formed in 
opposition to the “constitutive outside” of the dominant group. The different struggles of the 
dominated groups are combined through a “chain of equivalences” which identifies a singular 
group, the dominant group, as the cause of all problems (Laclau 2005, 73-87).  
The autonomy movement used a “chain of equivalences” to declare that centralism was 
the source of all problems and autonomy the solution. Populism derives power in the vagueness 
of its claims, and the autonomy movement used this to its advantage. Divergent understandings 
of what autonomy would mean motivated individuals to support autonomy for diverse reasons. 
However, for Santa Cruz’s business unions, aligned with the CPSC, autonomy constituted a 
radical form of decentralization which included regional control of natural resources (e.g. land, 
gas and timber), the right to maintain control over 2/3rds of tax revenues generated in the 
department, and the authority to control all policies within the department other than foreign 
affairs. This vision of autonomy far exceeded any of the forms of decentralization which had 
occurred in Latin America, drastically raising the stakes of the conflict (Eaton 2007, 73-74). The 
near total control of the department which Santa Cruz elites sought, Eaton notes, would also 
likely be negative for non-elite actors who were more likely to receive redistributive reforms 
from the progressive central government (Eaton 2007, 74). Thus autonomy was presented as a 




migrants in Santa Cruz that few people seemed to understand what autonomy will actually mean 
on the ground, and how or if it will affect the material conditions of the poor. He asserts; “By 
strategically presenting autonomy as a catchall, movement leaders seek to build support beyond 
the landholding elites” (Kirshner 2010, 111). 
However, the CPSC knew that building a broad coalition required more than rhetoric. It 
also reached out the marginal groups in more concrete ways. In order to win over workers, the 
CPSC took advantage of divisions within the State-affiliated Departmental Labor Federation 
(COD) and supported forcible power grabs by the right-wing interests within the federation. 
While some labor leaders sided with the MAS, others argued that the Central government’s labor 
federation (COD) was more concerned with public sector work, which had little benefit for 
cruceños, most of which are employed in the private sector. (Eaton 2017, 154) It also made 
“work” central to the drive for autonomy (despite the fact that many elites earn their wealth off 
of speculative landholding and the labor of others). Many of the early rallies declared themselves 
as being for “autonomy and work.” Carlos Daboub, a member of the CPSC and later Costas’ 
administration, asserted the autonomy movement is an expression of the Cruceño people’s desire 
to “live in peace and democracy, with autonomy and work” (Daboub Arrien, “The Pajutú 
Revolution”; accessed 2021). 
Winning over the lowland indigenous population also posed a challenge for the CPSC. 
The CPSC had long promoted the myth of feliz mestizaje (happy miscegenation) in the lowlands, 
promoting the view that lowland indigenous people have pushed back against statist regimes of 
the highlands since the Incas ruled. However, many lowland indigenous groups saw through the 
multicultural facade and distrusted the right-wing, business aligned interest of the CPSC (Eaton 




promising food and other benefits to members of indigenous communities who agreed to travel 
to the City of Santa Cruz to participate in the CPSC’s Special Assembly for indigenous people. 
However, this was seen as bribery and was criticized by some indigenous groups. Furthermore, 
many lowland indigenous leaders criticized the CPSC for fighting for departmental autonomy 
while rejecting claims of autonomy by indigenous groups. (Eaton 2017, 154) 
In 2004, Bonifacio Barrientos, a Guaraní leader, was named “Representative of the 
Indigenous Peoples of the Department to the CPSC” leading to a division within the Guarani 
community between pro-CPSC and anti-CPSC stances. However, Barrientos and other 
Indigenous leaders, attracted by political perks from the CPSC, precipitated a shift in allegiances 
of many lowland indigenous people. One Mojeño indigenous leader asserted this was not a result 
of trickery but a strategic allegiance; “I don’t buy the ‘happy miscegenation’ argument— the 
conquest was as brutal here as it was in the highlands. But, unlike the indigenous groups in the 
MAS, I don’t just want to ‘live well’ [vivir bien]. We want improvements and progress and a 
share of the profits that are generated by agriculture in this department.” (Eaton 2017, 155) 
Reflecting the incorporation of some lowland indigenous groups into the autonomy project, in 
2007 CPSC leaders introduced articles to their draft autonomy statute that were demanded by 
indigenous leaders. (Eaton 2017, 155) 
The CPSC also reached out to migrants, many of which come from the highlands and 
were not naturally allied with the autonomist cause. By 2010, 25% of the department and 38% of 
the city’s population were born outside of the department (Kirshner 2010, 109), making this an 
essential demographic to win over. The Committee made a conscious effort to create a more 
inclusive definition of Cruceñismo, defining Cruceños as those living in Santa Cruz rather than 




changed the definition of the cruceño from one of territorial, or even biological roots, to one of 
choice and thus de-ethnicized the category, broadening the boundary and making it more 
permeable” (Flesken 2018 56). 
 The CPSC staged cabildos in low-income areas of the city, including the barrio Plan Tres 
Mil where highland migrants are concentrated. Taking a play from the MAS’s playbook, the 
CPSC publicly promised more resources including health care, education and roads, to be 
supported by increasing natural-gas revenues. (Kirshner 2010, 108-109) The CPSC, while 
promoting spatial boundaries between groups in some ways, also helped marginalized groups 
overcome these boundaries to show popular support for their movement. A neighborhood-
association leader in the Plan Tres Mil reported that the CPSC funded buses and arranged for 
migrants from her neighborhood to come to the January 2005 protest against the reduction in 
government subsidies for diesel. The diesel issue was put front and center to unite agro-industry 
interests and the interests of the lower classes, whose transport costs were rising. However, at the 
rally, this leader stated “It was no longer about diesel, and only about the demand for autonomy, 
the referendum vote. This wasn’t what we wanted, and they hadn’t consulted with us” (Kirshner 
2010, 116-117) 
The movement built on an already strong departmental cultural identity among 
indigenous and non-indigenous cruceños alike. A study shows that the average level “feeling 
Cruceño” rose from an already high 5.6 on a 7-point scale in 2006 to 6.19 in 2008 [Figure 2] 
(Flesken 2018, 59-60). Male and poorer inhabitants were more likely to identify with the 
department than female and richer inhabitants. However, cruceño identity was remarkably 
distributed across race, at least in this study. During this period, lowland indigenous people 




department’s population as a whole (Flesken 2018, 60-61). While it is unclear if this small 
survey is representative of the population as a whole, it still demonstrates a remarkable level of 
regional consensus. 
 
Figure 3.3. Identification with regional identity in Santa Cruz, 2004–2010. Answers to a survey 
question ‘To what extent do you feel cruceño?’ measured on a 7-point scale. Source: Flesken, 
2018; https://doi.org/10.1177/0263395717697343 
 
The seeming paradox of poor and indigenous people’s identification with the cruceño 
identity (though not necessarily the autonomy movement) can partly be explained by socio-
spatial positionality. Leitner et. al asserts that while physical location can impact individuals’ 
abilities to access the resources necessary to participate in and contest social movements, an 
individual's sense of place is also deeply implicated in their decision to participate in collective 




interaction are more important in developing a strong collective identity than abstract, 
“objective” social position (Miller 2000, 34). 
Part of the reason socio-spatial positionality can explain the support for autonomy is the 
CPSC’s visibility in public space. The CPSC and allied elites’ domination of cultural activities in 
Santa Cruz meant that these frames were diffused at non-autonomy events as well, including 
business expos, street carnivals, and other regional cultural events (Gustafson 2006, 368).  
 The CPSC’s allied institutions provide a number of services including electricity and water to 
the city of Santa Cruz. Furthermore, private development institutions allied with the CPSC have 
undertaken many infrastructure projects in the city. The CPSC's implication in these public 
goods has legitimized its presence as the “moral government of the cruceños” (Eaton 2017 146). 
Therefore, the CPSC is deeply woven into the concrete space of the city and the lived experience 
of its inhabitants, thus providing credibility for its frames.  
Furthermore, Santa Cruz elites hold a “monopoly of public opinion,” and the elite-
dominated cruceño media depicts a very narrow range of viewpoints. Much of the Bolivian 
Media has connections to Santa Cruz agribusiness- two major Bolivian media conglomerates 
(Red uno and Unitel) are controlled by the Monasterio ranching family (Eaton 2017, 165). TV 
and print news disseminate the elites’ “epic historiography” of regional identity which 
demonizes the “centralism” of the state and sensationalizes highland migrants as a “highland 
invasion.” (Soruco, Plata and Medieros 2008, 93) For example, a 2015 editorial in El Diario, the 
longest running newspaper in Bolivia, stated; “This is the fundamental struggle that the Bolivian 
people have: Autonomy vs. Totalitarianism…Only the consciousness of the people, expressed in 
popular pressure, will be able to wrest from the clutches of centralism the resources that the 




Santa Cruz television media is “dare I say, worse than Fox News.” Much like Fox News, 
Televised news is widely watched by the Cruceño working classes, (“A New Beginning for 
Bolivia”, March 12, 2021) and has certainly contributed to the spread of autonomous sentiment.  
The success of the Autonomy movement shows space-based identity and infrastructure 
projects can not only be a tool wielded by elites in order to obscure issues of class but can come 
to be deeply felt as a regional-national identity by the general population. Indeed, Former CPSC 
president and Governor Rubén Costas continued popularity and re-elections in 2005, 2010 and 
2015 relied heavily on his focus on infrastructural improvements and support for agro-industrial 
elites. Drawing upon the ‘culture of capitalism’ elites had long fomented in the region, Costas 
criticized Morales’ program of offering small bonds to the poor, stating that his government 
would offer “seeds not bonds” (Eaton 2017, 159). His popular support not only “made it harder 
for detractors to dismiss the Santa Cruz model as merely an elitist manipulation,” but also 
demonstrates how many in Santa Cruz have come to view the capitalist successes of the region 
as a source of pride, whether or not they benefit from them. This was combined with a view by 
many that the benefits garnered from the department’s success as a whole would ‘trickle down’ 
and benefit marginalized groups more than the MAS would.  One Mojeño indigenous leader 
asserted that support for the CPSC was not a result of trickery but a strategic allegiance; “I don’t 
just want to ‘live well’ [vivir bien]. We want improvements and progress and a share of the 
profits that are generated by agriculture in this department.” (Eaton 2017, 155)  
The new cruceño identity was based around a capitalist cultural ideal and political 
orientation. Regional elites have long depicted the department as a “modernizing pioneer” 
(Gustafson 2006, 365) attributing Santa Cruz’s relative economic prosperity from its ability to 




utilized “pull yourself up by the bootstraps” rhetoric, asserting that lowland people must come 
together to defend their right to private property and businesses in the face of the redistributive 
state (Fabricant and Postero 2013, 193). Economic rhetoric was closely linked to racialized 
rhetoric. The redistributive land reform proposed by Morales, which would redistribute 
unproductive land and thus threaten speculative land holding, was likened to the land invasions 
by the Bolivian MST  and the “invasion” or highland migrants. Signs at numerous autonomy 
rallies declared; “The Land is Ours, Invaders Get Out!” (Gustafson 2007, 357). 
While protests almost exclusively happened in the city of Santa Cruz, the culture of 
capitalism had long been disseminated in the countryside as a way to maintain the hegemonic 
social relations. Valdivia, in her study of agrarian elites, asserts that “selective memory” has 
been utilized by the Santa Cruz elite to promote the rare cases of that upward mobility as proof 
that agricultural elites have earned their station in life, valorizing hard work and demonizing 
poverty. (Valdivia 2010, 76-77) In this as “partial amnesia”, the long historical and institutional 
basis of inequality is overlooked in favor of instances of upward mobility, (Valdivia 2010, 77-
78) while legitimizing existing inequalities of race and class as “natural” (Valdivia 2010, 68). 
One agricultural elite who was interviewed argued that people from the highlands know nothing 
about hard work; they “are used to herding llamas, not working seven days a week, under the hot 
sun, with all the diseases and mosquitos you have here.” (Valdivia 2010, 77) 
 The “selective memory” of upward mobility in a highly unequal society was not limited 
to elites, as demonstrated by the widespread support for the autonomy movement. As one 
highlander exclaimed in a Civic Committee meeting in 2010, “here in the land of the Oriente that 
I have awakened. We are living well, eating well, and we have work. Those who don’t are lazy.” 





Monocultures and “Multiculturalism” 
Performance of regional identity and folkorized elements of lowlands indigenous culture 
became a central tactic of the autonomy movement. Cruceños increasingly identified as mestizos 
who shared heritage with indigenous people of Santa Cruz, including Guarani, Besiro and 
Guarayu, who Cruceños consider “our ethnics”. Additionally, many Cruceños began identifying 
as “Cambas,” once a derogatory term for indigenous peons, reclaimed as a regional identity 
(Gustafson 2006, 356). Lowrey asserts; “ This abrazo of Guaraní heritage is pre-eminently 
talismanic in that it wards off the accusations of racism that otherwise would become crippling in 
the post 1990s political milieu.”(Lowrey 2006, 72) 
In the political atmosphere of Bolivia and Latin America as a whole, performing 
difference and indigeneity to bolster their claims of oppression. A statement on Santa Cruz 
department website asserts “No one can deny us the right to see, feel and understand ourselves 
differently in a diverse and heterogeneous world like the contemporary one”(“Ideología 
Cruceña”, Santacruz.gob.bo; accessed 2021). 
Yet I argue that despite the claims of diversity and the use of indigenous symbols in 
public space, the CPSC has very much treated indigeneity in the neoliberal manner of 
multiculturalism rather than the plurinationalism espoused by Morales. According to Hale, using 
multiculturalism to uphold a capitalist system is not new. Rather, he argues that multiculturalism 
is part of the “cultural project” of neoliberalism and that in Latin America, the Mestizo ideology 
of state-building in the 20th century has been replaced with multiculturalism, which is more 




(Hale 2004, 17). The core of the neoliberal project is “the creation of subjects who govern 
themselves in accordance with the logic of global capitalism” thus a diversity of cultures is 
embraced only if they function within the bounds of these systems”(Hale 2004, 17). Therefore, 
he asserts “Far from eliminating racial inequity, as the rhetoric of multiculturalism seems to 
promise, these reforms reconstitute racial hierarchies in more entrenched forms.” (Hale 2004, 16) 
 Crabtree and Whitehead do not see Bolivia’s multiculturalism as having arisen from 
neoliberalism, but something which has persisted since colonial times. They assert: “From its 
origins, Bolivian multiculturalism was such that it sustained the blatant asymmetries of 
neocolonial society. This is its founding structure, the “original sin” that, in one way or another, 
continues to shape its historical destiny”(Crabtree and Whitehead 2008, 18) 
 During the autonomy movement, the incorporation of indigenous groups, migrants and 
workers into the project gave the movement a popular, multicultural face. The autonomy 
movement produced a new kind of “Indio Permitido.” The “indio permitido” (“Authorized 
Indian”) was coined by Bolivian sociologist Silvia Rivera, defining how governments use 
“cultural rights to divide and domesticate indigenous movements.”(Hale 2004, 17) Loyalty to the 
autonomy project seemingly offered the prospect of sharing in regional prosperity, or jobs in 
regional government. CPSC’s incorporation of lowland indigenous leaders exemplifies how 
“neoliberal elites gain the wisdom to respond to their indigenous critics not by suppressing 
dissent, but by offering them a job.”’(Hale 2004, 19) On the other hand, Lowland indigenous 
organizations who attempt to assert any kind of sovereignty are depicted as “traitors to the 
region” who stand as a roadblock to regional goals (Gustafson 2006, 353). 
 




The essential emptiness of the Autonomy movement’s “multicultural” face can be seen in 
the violence of movement actors. Indeed, the seeming regional consensus cannot be understood 
without also looking at the violent suppression of dissenting voices which movement leaders 
have benefited from and even encouraged.  Individuals critical of the CPSC experienced “civic 
death,” facing public harassment and being banned from cafés and restaurants(Eaton 2017, 156). 
The clearest illustration of elite-led violence comes with the UJC. The Unión Juveníl Cruceñista 
(UJC), the youth counterpart to the CPSC, has acted as the “strong arm” of the civic committee 
since its inception in the 1950s. In the contemporary autonomy movement, UJC members 
performed spectacles of violence along with acting out very real bodily violence against 
dissenters. In one 2006 rally, UJC youths beat a life-size doll of Morales with sticks and belts, 
calling him a dictator and a drug addict. They later burned the effigy while chanting 
“Autonomía, Autonomía, Autonomía!” The doll was set on fire as the UJC members chanted 
around it. (Fabricant 2009, 776) Group leaders later gave fiery speeches, asserting “it is our duty 
to defend Santa Cruz” and repeating the motto “Violence for the sake of reclamation and 
redemption” (Fabricant 2009, 778). Fabricant asserts: “Such carnivals of violence not only 
imposed order on the resistant indigenous body but also reinforced the elites’ reign over the 
urban spaces of Santa Cruz”(Fabricant 2009, 778).  
Fabricant notes that the ideological genealogy of the UJC traces directly back to the 
Nazis, originating from Nazis who fled to South America after world war 1. The founder of the 
UJC had close ties to former Nazi Klaus Barbie, the “Butcher of Lyon,” who escaped to Bolivia 
in the post war period and worked as an interrogator under Santa Cruz-born dictator Hugo 




from Nazi youth brigades to inculcate members into the group, tactics that have survived to the 
present day (Fabricant 2009, 778).  
Santa Cruz elites have cast extremist UJC youths as marginal actors, however in my view 
the UJC’s role as the “strong arm” of the Santa Cruz elites has been essential in maintaining the 
sociospatial configuration of Santa Cruz. In September 2008, a Civic leader Rafael Paz called in 
the UJC to expel members of the MST (Landless Peasant Movement) from his land. The 
paramilitary youth engaged in tactics of torture and intimidation to extract information about the 
movement. One UJC member claimed the “MST is just a camouflaged arm of the larger MAS 
movement; they enter into other people’s land [which is being worked] and they disrespect us…. 
They defy constitutional rights to property ownership and therefore must be pacified through 
violence”(Fabricant 2009, 779). This marked the beginning of a violent two months in 2008 
which were a turning point for the autonomy movement.  
Days after the attack on the MST, the UJC members attacked NGO lawyers, peasant and 
indigenous activists in the city, along with conducting a raid on the state land reform agency 
INRA as directed by the leader of the CPSC Branko Marinkovic(Eaton 2017, 156-157). 
Marinkovic was later implicated in the hiring of mercenaries to kill Morales and overthrow the 
MAS, but this coup attempt was intercepted by the Bolivian police (Eaton 2017, 154).  
When U.S. Ambassador to Bolivia was expelled from the country by Morales for supporting 
regionalist occupations, the eastern right flew into a frenzy. After years of escalating violence 
against indigenous and campesino dissenters in the lowlands, the most severe and horrifying act 
of violence took place on September 11, 2008. In Pando, right wing autonomists opened fire on 




Ximena Soruco argues that the Pando Massacre was the last stand of a weakened right 
wing, desperate to maintain territorial control over regional space (Fabricant 2009, 780).  
Following the violence of 2008, the arrests of leading members of the Santa Cruz opposition 
made headlines, and the days of massive autonomy protests came to an end. However, it did not 
take long for Santa Cruz elites to change their tactics.  
 
From Hunger Strikes to Food Shortages: Shifting Modes of Hegemony 
 
Following the failure of violence and mass protest, in late 2008, Santa Cruz elites began 
to wield their power as producers of a large proportion of Bolivia’s food in order to get their 
way. Eaton asserts: “While the arrest or exile of leading members of the Santa Cruz opposition 
made headlines, a deeper policy-based process of territorial reconciliation—initially subtle and 
hesitant but increasingly explicit and public— unfolded over the course of Morales’s second 
term as president (2009-2014.) In effect, Santa Cruz compelled Morales to end the historic 
“process de Cambio” through which he promised to transform Bolivia, dramatically shifting his 
government in a liberal direction.”(Eaton 2017, 163) 
Agro-industry had long maintained their system through a number of institutions and 
unions, including Anapo (the Oilseed and Wheat grower’s union), CAO (The Eastern Chamber 
of Agriculture) and CAINCO (the Chamber of industry and Commerce) and CADEX (Chamber 
of exporters). These institutions had coalesced under the CPSC and strengthened their ties amid 
the autonomy movement, while also gaining widespread popular support within the department.  
 Following the failure of coup attempt by Marinkovic, Santa Cruz elites implemented an 




their vision. The 2008-2010 “food emergency” occurred when Morales promulgated legislation 
which implemented export quotas and stabilized food prices in order to deliver upon one of his 
main campaign promises of “food sovereignty.” . (Eaton 2017, 164) Furthermore, Morales’s 
promotion of redistributive land reforms threatened eastern elites. The spike of land invasions in 
2009 by landless peasants further concerned elites, who saw Morales as encouraging land 
invasions. Moreover, The FES (Social and Economic) requirement of land law which required 
landowners prove they are putting it to use, disturbed largescale landowners, who saw this as a 
lack of legal security of landownership and a limit to profitable land speculation.  
In 2008, agricultural elites severely limited food production in order to pressure Morales, 
resulting in food shortages across Bolivia. This resulted in mass protest, and Morales eventually 
came to moderate his platform. Across the political spectrum there became a consensus that “so 
much of the country depends on Santa Cruz for food that Evo discovered he could not just do 
whatever he wants here.”(Eaton 2017, 166) 
While similar regional separatist movements have happened in Peru and Ecuador over 
natural gas rents, they were not as successful in influencing the policies of the nation (Eaton 
2017, 164). Furthermore, autonomist movements in the natural gas producing departments of the 
lowlands were not nearly as extreme or successful, despite natural gas being the Bolivian 
government’s most important source of revenue. I argue that this demonstrates the validity of 
Zavaleta Mercado’s assertion that ““A country is always what its agriculture is”(Mercado 1984, 
22).  
The MAS’s project of transformation was deeply shaped, and in this case limited by 
Bolivia’s socionature- that is, the political and the historical etched into the natural landscape of 




economic transformations from 1952 revolution and the subsequent neoliberal agrarian reforms, 
which disrupted the traditional patterns of peasant agriculture in the highlands and promoted 
Santa Cruz as the “breadbasket of Bolivia.”  
While public protests for autonomy dropped precipitously following the Pando Massacre 
(Figure 1), the autonomy movement elites drive for territorial control had just begun. Despite 
vice president Alvaro Garcia Linera’s claim in 2010 that the national government had defeated 
the autonomy movement “electorally, military and politically” (Eaton 2017, 163) the movement 
in fact succeeded in its spatial and socionatural goals, continuing to uphold social systems and 
modes of production “which destroy diversity and legitimize that destruction as progress, growth 





CHAPTER 4. AUTONOMY’S LONG SHADOW:  
DESTRUCTION OF (BIO)DIVERSITY IN THE AGRO-STATE 
 
On December 21st, 2010, Evo Morales passed Law No. 071: The Law of the Rights of 
Mother Earth. This law guaranteed the rights of Mother Earth, banned marketization and 
livelihoods and the natural processes that support then, and established the Plurinational 
Authority on Mother Earth, an authority to oversee the implementation of the MAS’s 
environmental agenda (Müller, Pacheco and Montero 2014, 30). 
 Less than a decade later, in August 2019, wildfires burned across the Amazon. Santa 
Cruz was by far the region with the highest incidence of forest fires, and many pointed fingers 
towards slash-and-burn land clearances for cattle and soy. The previous month, Evo Morales had 
met with businessmen in the eastern departments to celebrate the promulgation of Supreme 
Decree 3973, which permitted the clearing of forests and ‘controlled burning” of the forest for 
agricultural production. Many have pointed to this decree as the cause of the fires. (Página Siete, 
27 Aug. 2019 
 These two moments mark the tail ends of a decade in which was defined by immense 
change in the MAS and Bolivia as a whole, specifically due to Evo Morales and the MAS’s shift 
towards a neoliberal model of development with an emphasis on agriculture. Soy came to be 
Bolivia’s third largest source of foreign exchange after gas and mining, makes 3% of the GDP 
and 10% of total exports. The boom in soy produced new alliances between the MAS and 
regional and transnational economic elites through the production of a number of policies which 
benefit agrarian elites and promote consolidated production. According to Fabricant and 




“backroom deals” with Santa Cruz agrarian elites that “virtually nullify” radical land reforms 
which might limit large-scale landowners. (Fabricant and Gustafson 2016, 274) Furthermore, 
Morales announced in 2012 ambitious plans to increase the area of land under production from 
2.7 million hectares in 2015 to 4.5 million hectares by 2020.(Fabricant and Gustafson 2016, 274-
275)  Despite the values outlined in the Law of Mother Earth, which prevents commercialization 
and commodification of the earth, as the decade progressed reforms and laws increasingly sided 
with the lowland agro-industrial elite and their export-oriented system of monocultures. Morales 
and the MAS received criticism from the national and international left for their embrace of 
capitalist agriculture and their failure to prevent the environmental destruction associated. 
Deforestation steadily accelerated throughout the 2010s, particularly in Santa Cruz and 
neighboring lowland departments (Fig. 1).  
 
Figure 4.1. Annual Tree Cover Loss in Santa Cruz (Hectares) from 2001-2019. Spike in 2019 
represents Amazon Fires. Data from Global Forest Watch 






Of the scholarly attention that the Santa Cruz autonomy movement has received, the vast 
majority has focused on the mass protests of the 2000s. Less understood is how deeply the 
alliance of eastern elites, international agro-industrial interests, and the popular movement which 
legitimated them have played in the course of Morales, and Bolivia’s, history.  
The US left media and a great deal of American scholars have criticized Morales’s shift towards 
neoliberalism and environmental degradation as proof that his socialist and indigenous rhetoric 
were merely rhetoric, or at very least that his values were corrupted by his hunger for power. In 
2014, following Morales’ third re-election, the New York Times called Morales one of the “new 
Caudillos” whose presidency was weakening democracy in the region (New York Times, 16 Oct. 
2014).  
US-based scholars Brabazon and Webber argue that Morales’ government is a 
reconstituted form of neoliberalism, with an emphasis on social participation, diversification of 
economic relations, and social spending. They assert that Reconstituted neoliberalism in the 
Bolivian context is a “tactical attempt by the Bolivian ruling classes to adjust to the social 
contradictions generated by the implementation of neoliberalism in the country while preserving 
the class project underlying neoliberalism and the successes it has enjoyed.” Brabazon and 
Webber see the Bolivian project as a form of “actually existing neoliberalism” which 
demonstrates the flexibility of neoliberalism and its ability to adapt to contexts which are hostile 
to it. (Brabazon and Webber 2014, 437) 
While this critique and the many others like it have merit, I also hesitate in downplaying 




2005 to August 2006, the MAS distributed 3.5 million hectares (9 million acres) to landless 
communities. Furthermore, the state itself set up its first MST-style settlement in 2006, Pueblos 
Unidos. This settlement allowed 628 landless communities practice their communal systems of 
agriculture upon 16 thousand hectares of land outside of Santa Cruz. Ezinna asserted in 2008 
“Pueblos Unidos is a powerful sign of progress for Bolivia’s landless peasants, intently 
monitoring the progress of Morales’ reform.”( Ezinna 2008, 230) 
So how did the MAS shift from openly supporting the MST to forming deep alliances 
with agroindustry? To understand this, I have looked to Bolivian scholars, who have taken a 
more nuanced approach to understanding the role which eastern elites and agroindustry have 
played in influencing the direction of Bolivia’s politics. I have also drawn from works by the 
TIERRA foundation, an organization dedicated studying agrarian change in Bolivia. A 
significant portion of my research, however, has focused on Bolivian newspapers, particularly 
Página Siete, the largest independent paper in Bolivia. 
In this chapter, I argue that Santa Cruz elites and their allies were effectively able to steer 
the course of Bolivia away from Morales’s original proceso de cambio and towards their 
preferred model. Despite the initial claims of the autonomy movement, this model isn’t a free-
market system in which Santa Cruz is completely autonomous. Rather, this system is constituted 
in selective autonomy, in which Santa Cruz elites are given the political and legal autonomy 
which allow them to uphold their systems of monocultures, while the state is still relied upon for 
its maintenance of legal private property and subsidies which support agriculture. Santa Cruz 
elites who once called for autonomy became increasingly allied with Morales’ government as a 
result of their dependence on the support of the state, particularly due to the climatic effects that 




 From an analysis of news articles and scholarly research from the 2010s, I conclude Evo 
Morales and the MAS increasingly gave in to the demands of Santa Cruz due to several 
geopolitical causes; The fall in global oil prices; The threat of violence in Santa Cruz and the 
necessity of maintaining food security. However, these factors alone to not explain why Santa 
Cruz elites were able to reproduce their regional hegemony at the national scale. Deeply 
implicated in the mitigation of Morales’ revolutionary agenda was the global monoculture of the 
food regime, a network of agribusiness and food elites, NGOs and governments who promote 
industrial agriculture and assert that it is the best and most productive way of producing. I argue 
that the events of the 2010s in Bolivia emphatically prove that this model has deleterious effects 
on the environment and the social fabric of Bolivia, putting not only nature but alternative forms 
of knowledge at risk.  I maintain that these dual processes of monoculture production that 
occurred in Santa Cruz in the 2000s were neither economically nor socially enriching, but rather 
in both cases “Monocultures spread not because they produce more, but because they control 
more” (Shiva 1993, 7) 
Renee Zavaleta Mercado asserts that multiple iterations of the state could exist on top of 
a singular mode of agricultural production, and thus a singular set of socionatural relationships, 
which are in fact what determine society. In his view, the state merely constitutes “juridical 
forms of circulation superimposed upon local practices of the transformation of nature”, thus the 
state itself can “never be more than a weakly supported facade.”(Zavaleto Mercado 1986, 
229)  From this perspective I analyze how the revolutionary horizons of the MAS have been 
severely limited by the networks of international actors, capital, and regional elites which uphold 




indigenous liberation, racial equality, and Vivir bien of people and the environment cannot truly 
be achieved while industrial agriculture is embedded within their vision of development. 
 
Rise of the MAS Agro-state 
MAS’s reluctance to carry out the land reform of their ‘Agrarian Revolution, Tilzey 
argues, was evident since 2010, when the MAS shifted its focus to land registration rather than 
expropriation and redistribution. This, Tilzey argues, left the landed oligarchy “unchallenged” 
(Tilzey 2019a, 636). Beyond leaving the land distribution of Santa Cruz unchallenged, the MAS 
also actively colluded with agro-industry.  However, the MAS’s view of lowlands agro-industry 
shifted from cautiously granting regional elites’ regional control, to a much deeper alliance 
between agriculture and the state. The beginnings of this alliance came alongside the end of the 
food crisis ( and, ironically the promulgation of the Law of Mother Earth). An analysis in Página 
Siete in 2013 asserted that the MAS regime had for the previous 2 years been developing “a 
close alliance with the Santa Cruz business community, with the CAO, in part with CAINCO, 
with the oilseed confederation. the relationship is intimate…” The article asserted that this 
alliance was borne out of the uncertainty of the food crisis along with the attempts of the MAS to 
stay in power; “The President has to bet more, give more for the attention of the people now than 
in 2006. Each sector seeks its own perk and for the next elections the perks will have to be 
greater” (Pagina Siete, 28 Sep. 2013). 
 Demonstrating this burgeoning alliance, proposals began circulating in late 2013 
surrounding a Morales new development policy that he would carry out if re-elected in 2014, 
heavily centering the role of agroindustry. Proposals emerged which discussed the radical 




contribute to the country’s food security and sovereignty (Página Siete, 4 Oct. 2013). These 
proposals not only targeted the support of the agrarian elites but addressed the issue of food 
sovereignty that was on the mind of many Bolivians following the food crisis. However harmful 
effects of the expansion of the agricultural frontier were are already becoming evident, 
contributing to the severe climatic phenomena that hit Santa Cruz throughout the 2010s (Página 
Siete, 13 Dec. 2013).  Following severe droughts of 2013, Santa Cruz businessmen spoke to 
Morales and requested he remove the restriction on food exports so that they could make up for 
the losses caused by drought. In November of 2013, the Government approved a higher soy 
export quota through supreme decree despite the growth of soy faltering (Página Siete, 4 Nov. 
2013). This pattern of climatic losses followed by agribusiness the government for help repeated 
over the next few years, with agribusiness making ground each time. Their argument nearly 
always proceeded in the same way, following the model which the autonomy movement hoped 
to achieve; free exports; provide subsidies for diesel and loans for climatic losses; permit 
genetically modified organisms; and enforce legal ownership of land. 
A central consideration of the MAS’s alliance with big agriculture were the falling prices 
of minerals and gas. By 2014, the commodity boom which began in approximately 2003 seemed 
to be coming to an end. Mineral prices fell by 20%, while hydrocarbons and soy fell 2.9% and 
2.4% respectively. Bolivia’s economic dependence on primary commodities posed an imminent 
threat to the MAS government, which relied on hydrocarbon rents in order to enact its social 
programs (Loza, 5 Apr. 2014). While Soy prices were nearly as volatile as hydrocarbons, 
agribusiness and its proponents used the end of the commodity boom as justification for the 




In February of 2014, the burgeoning alliance between Morales and Santa Cruz resulted in 
a significant concession. Morales promulgated a modification to the Law 337 to Support Food 
Production and Forest Restitution. This law established that after one year, producers would be 
able to regularize ownership of land they illegally cleared on the condition that food is being 
produced. The announced goal was to increase food production “and thus restore forests.”  The 
head of the Oilseed Growers Association ANAPO said this would allow large, medium and 
small producers who cleared land illegally to produce food (Mamani, 27 Feb. 2014). A month 
later, ExpoSoya, in Santa Cruz, Morales announced a supreme decree which allowed the exports 
of 300 thousand tons of surplus soybeans. The CAO president and a Santa Cruz government 
representative thanked Morales for his “determined participation in supporting production in the 
eastern part of the country” (Página Siete, 15 Mar. 2014). 
That year, the cultivated area in Bolivia grew by an astounding 40%, most of which made 
up of soy (Página Siete, 23 Dec. 2014). However, at the same time, the worsening climatic 
conditions caused soybean exports to fall by 68.51% (Página Siete, 14 Feb. 2015). 
 
The MAS’s War on Landless Peasants 
 While the successes of the Autonomy movement prevented major land expropriation 
from taking place in Santa Cruz, agribusiness elites argued throughout the 2010s that the 
government must provide further legal security for their land. Landless peasant invasions spiked 
in 2009 along economic turmoil and food shortages, and Santa Cruz agribusiness elites believed 
that Morales was responsible. These elites encouraged the liberal Bolivian Institute of Foreign 
Trade (IBCE) to visit “invaded farms” and create a press release in attempt to foment opposition 




Trade (IBCE) carried out this visit, and reported that more than 70 agro-productive farms had 
been “overwhelmed” by landless peasants Santa Cruz. The president of ANAPO denounced the 
“bullies” for their “abuses” on the farms, adding that the “assaults” affected more than 50,000 
hectares (Página Siete, 28 Dec. 2013). The MAS, despite initially radical rhetoric about land 
redistribution, agreed to support the expulsion of landless peasants. The Vice Minister of Rural 
Development and Lands, Víctor Hugo Vásquez, asked the judicial authorities identify those 
responsible for the assaults and punish them with the full weight of the law. "In this country 
there is no place to appropriate private property," said the authority (Página Siete, 16 Nov. 
2013). 
While the early years of the MAS had built its populist project with landless peasants in 
mind, directly referring to the MST as an example of the future which they were trying to build, 
the MAS agro-state increasingly identified landless peasants as enemies of agrarian 
development. Tilzey asserts that the post-2010 MAS increasingly promoted their populist project 
on the ideal of the small productive farmers, a class of upper peasantry which had grown in size 
under the redistributive policies of the MAS. At the same time, however, agroindustry had 
accelerated issues of semi-proletarianization and landlessness. Thus, the upper peasantry and 
small-scale capitalist farmers formed the new populist alliance of the MAS, considering that they 
followed logics which did not threaten the agrarian oligarchy (Tilzey 2019a, 637). 
Likely with re-election in mind, Morales and the MAS cracked down on landless peasant 
invasions in the year leading up to the 2014 election. The Association of Agricultural Productive 
Farms (ASPPA), formed in 2012, worked in conjunction with the National Land Institute 
(INRA) to remove “land invaders” (Escóbar, 30 Sep. 2014).  September 2014 in Página Siete 




previous year (Escóbar, 30 Sep. 2014). Landowners made clear that legal certainty of land would 
determine whether they would contribute to the Government’s objective of providing food 
security by 2025. (Escóbar, 30 Sep. 2014). Morales and Linera were likely acutely of the threat 
of food shortages should they dare turn a blind eye to land invasions.   
 
The “Patriotic Agenda” and the Expansion of the Frontier  
 
 Morales was re-elected in October of 2014 into unwelcoming economic circumstances. 
An analyst said of his economic environment: “It cannot be said that the bonanza ended, but the 
brightest hour has passed. Prosperity falls slowly but falls.” .”(Página Siete,18 Oct. 
2014)  Morales’s re-election coincided with increased pressure from the soybean sector for 
government subsidies to support them through the losses incurred by climate change. 
Importantly, the MAS no longer held a majority in congress, and agro-industry representatives 
once again held prominent positions in the national government. “They are not MAS militants, 
they are representatives of their sectors, and they will assume their defense ” (Página Siete,18 
Oct. 2014) The next month, as predicted, a drop in oil prices was announced (Página Siete, 13 
Nov. 2014). 
 The new MAS government promulgated the Patriotic Agenda 2025, which prominently 
featured agro-industrial development as a strategy for national development, echoing tenets of 
Santa Cruz’s own development model. Most significantly, the Government challenged the agro-
industrial sector to triple food production and expand the agricultural frontier by 13 million 




 Despite framing the expansion of agro-industry as a defense of food sovereignty, 
researchers question the efficacy of this rout. Researchers from the Tierra Foundation warned 
that agro-industrial production in fact posed a threat to food security as Santa Cruz 
agroindustrialists prefer to plant soy for export rather than food. The study found that from 2001 
to 2013, transgenic soybeans increased by 622,000 hectares, while potato, a staple part of the 
Bolivian diet, grew only 2,000 hectares. Furthermore, many other staple foods have decreased 
since 2001, including tomatoes, garlic, broad beans, cassava, grain barley and even animal 
fodder, such as alfalfa and barley. As a result, Bolivian diets have shifted towards including more 
sugar, rice, chicken, oil, dairy and processed food (Página siete, Nov. 5 2014). A further 
study by the Tierra Foundation also challenged the idea that an expansion of soy production 
would contribute to national economic growth. The study revealed that the benefactors of this 
expansion will be transnationals, who control 90% of the collection and exportation of grain. 
Castañón asserted “the soy and Santa Cruz business in general is an oligopolistic system. There 
are five companies that they control more than 90% of the stockpiling and export of grain 
(Página Siete, 5 Nov. 2014).  
Indeed, the period from 2003 to 2013 saw the greatest increases in imports of machinery 
and equipment, intensifying the use of capital in agriculture and reducing the salaried labor force 
per cultivated hectare. An editorialist in Página Siete asserted in 2014 “in the name of the 
country's food sovereignty [the Patriotic Agenda] intended to favor the accumulation of capital 
of the agricultural and agro-industrial bourgeoisie in a context of decline in the prices of others. 
export products such as minerals and hydrocarbons.”( Ramírez, 11 Dec. 2014 ). 





By 2015, more than 43% of the Bolivian territory in the process of desertification due to poor 
land management, monocultures, and climate change. Producers combatted desertification 
through fertilizers, which were almost entirely imported and dominated by a few transnationals. 
That year, Bolivia ranked among the 6 countries with the highest deforestation rate (Fig. 2), 
which combined with its status as one of 10 mega-biodiverse countries spelled a severe threat to 
biodiversity ( Saaravia, 30 Apr. 2015). 
 
 
Figure 4.2: Average annual deforestation from 1976-2010 in Bolivia. Data from Müller, 
Pacheco and Montero 2014, p.9.  
 
It was in this context that the Sembrado Agricultural Summit occurred in April of 2015, 
in which agribusiness met with the MAS government. producers and committees 
including ANAPO, CAINCO and CAO demanded the government change the Economic and 
Social Function of land law, which required land fulfill a social or economic purpose, was 




insecurity of legal ownership that prevented investment. (Página Siete, 25 Apr. 2015) However, 
it certainly also spoke to their concerns over speculative landholding, a profitable business as the 
value of productive land increased fivefold between 2007 and 2013, largely due to state 
investments in irrigation and road access  (Página Siete, 6 Dec. 2014). Producers also argued for 
laws which would facilitate the expansion of the agricultural frontier, and the permission to 
freely use GM seeds. Producers argued that these measures would help to “get rid of the 
ideology shown by the government in its early years, focused on restricting the activity of 
Bolivian entrepreneurs in that sector.” Página Siete, 25 Apr. 2015) The government agreed to all 
demand save for those involving GM seeds, and asserted that these changes would cause the 
private sector to make more investment in agriculture, which would lead to greater food 
production and economic output. (Página Siete, 23 Apr. 2015a) Producers celebrated the new 
administration for its “approach to development, which matches the vision of 
entrepreneurs.”(Página Siete, 25 Apr. 2015) 
This meeting, and the subsequent reforms was of fundamental importance to the new 
direction of Bolivia under Morales third, and final, term. If Morales initial “process of change” 
had not yet ended, this little discussed meeting certainly can be seen as its unceremonious death. 
The event left many Bolivians questioning who agro-state alliance really served. As of 2015, 
Agriculture contributes to 0.01% of state income, 10 times less than mining. The industry is 
barely taxed, and by that time there was “no intention of the state to promote a similar policy 
toward the national agribusiness,” which continued to benefit from significant state subsidies on 
diesel. Furthermore, a significant part of the profits generated by the sector did not stay in the 




70% of cultivated area of soybeans was in the hands of foreigners in 2007 (Castañón 5 Jun. 
2015). 
Miguel Urioste, head researcher at the Tierra Foundation, argued that Bolivia was 
experiencing an accelerated expansion of the agro-extractivist capitalist accumulation model 
Urioste asserted that the Agro-state pact sought to “ensure that in the medium-term Bolivia is 
part of the largest league of soybean producers in the world.” However, these results, he argues, 
will be deleterious. He claims that Bolivia is following in the footsteps of Paraguay’s agrarian 
transition over the last decade, which resulted in one million displaced peasants and six million 
hectares of deforestation (Urioste, 31 Jul. 2015). 
Morales’ shift towards embracing industrial agriculture can be only partially explained by 
his interest in promoting food sovereignty and his need to make up for the economic deficit left 
by the fall in oil prices. It also speaks to international pressures that extend far beyond the 
borders of Bolivia, rooted in an ideology of industrial monoculture production which is promoted 
by governments, agro-food corporations and NGOs.  Bolivia’s shift towards monocultures of 
industrial soy reflects trends taking place across the South American continent. Mass production 
of soy which is largely destined to feed livestock in Brazilian and Chinese markets, has 
supplanted other forms of more sustainable agriculture and resulted in severe environmental 
effects. On September 23 and 24 2015, the III International Andean Amazonian Rural 
Development Forum was held, in which exhibitors from Bolivia, Brazil, Ecuador, Argentina, 
Colombia, Paraguay and Peru met to discuss this issue.  Paraguayan sociologist Quintín 
Riquelme shared that his country, which opted for the agro-industrial agricultural model in the 
1950s, has seen massive displacement and, among other consequences, the reduction of food 




farms. All the items that you know of peasant production: cassava, beans, corn ... Monoculture 
expels people. Before, more peasant families lived, today they live less because there is a very 
large area with mechanization. And those people come to the city, where they live in poor 
conditions and the condition of the city in general also worsens.” Those who stay near to 
agroindustry in Argentina are called "fumigated peoples", as they are subjected to the chemicals 
used in monoculture production.  A representative asserted at the forum that, worryingly, this is a 
"phenomenon that is entering Bolivia” (Página Siete, 26 Sep. 2015). 
 However, in Bolivia, as had happened across the continent, the forces of free-trade 
liberalism and agroindustry which have upheld the food regime overpowered the voices which 
questioned industrial agriculture. A representative of the IBCE brushed of the concerns raised by 
the conference; “What is the use of a country having an extensive territory, productive 
possibilities and natural resources and that all this remains unexploited… What is the use of 
longing for idyllic scenarios of peasants producing only for themselves and without connecting 
to the market….Bolivia must become a great producer and exporter of food, hopefully with 
added value, because only through this will food sovereignty will be achieved.” When asked 
what agricultural model should be followed in order to prevent harmful effects, the IBCE 
representative responded, “The model is in Santa Cruz, where there is a scale production system 
with technology, but also respectful of the environment, sustainable over time and socially 
responsible and inclusive.” (Página Siete, 26 Sep. 2015) 
 Critics of Morales noted the irony of the government’s newfound affinity to Santa Cruz’s 
elites and their ideologies. Vice President García Linera’s 2010 statement about the defeat of the 




“The MAS, after defeating the Santa Cruz oligarchy, politically and militarily, allows it to 
reproduce its economic model and now earn more money than ever” (Rada, 27 Jul. 2016). 
 
Multinationals in Santa Cruz 
 
 Agro-food multinationals which are based in the global north have come to see Bolivia 
not as a supplier of food- almost all exports go to the protected Andean market- but as a 
consumer of agro-chemicals and genetically modified seeds. To this end, Morales and the MAS 
were roadblocks, as they made GMOs other than one kind of GM soy illegal. Still, 
Multinationals including Monsanto and Bayer had promulgated ties with Santa Cruz agro-
industry since the 1990s. Agro -food corporations such as Bayer display their products at 
EXPOSOYA and EXPOCRUZ, large industry events held in the city of Santa Cruz each 
October. (Página Siete, 22 Oct. 2015 , 16 Mar. 2018).  
 Despite agro-industry’s claim that GM crops are superior, Glyphosate herbicide tolerant 
soy, the only authorized GM crop in Bolivia since 2005 has not improved production. In the 5 
years prior GM authorization Soy production yielded 1.98 tons per hectare, while in the 5 years 
after authorization when 92% of the soy produced was GM, yields averaged 1.80 tons per 
hectare. While producers have cited an increase in soybean production in tons per year during 
this period, this was due to the expansion of cultivated hectares.(Vargas, 14 Aug. 2016). At the 
same time, the chemical inputs required for monoculture production, which are sold by 
multinationals, increased drastically. From 1999 to 2015, the use of agrochemicals tripled for 
each cultivated hectare (Página Siete, 17 Oct. 2017). An editorial in El Diario, articulating a rare 




transgenic soy represents almost 36% of the cultivated area in the country is in a disaster 
phase…. There is a total dependence on seed and agrochemical corporations that has led to the 
total loss of scientific sovereignty…. and [Bolivia] has come to be totally dependent on patented 
seeds and agrochemicals, many of which are internationally prohibited due to their high degree 
of toxicity”(El Diario, 23 Sep. 2018).   
While the promoters of GM crops speak of "democratization of technology", in reality 
they seek the opening of markets for GM seeds and pesticides, and the high input costs and focus 
on monocultures exclude the majority of peasants.(Vargas, 14 Aug. 2016) From 1999 to 2015, 
the use of agrochemicals tripled for each cultivated hectare in Bolivia. (Página Siete, 17 Oct. 
2017) A study by Bascopé and Bickel asserts that of the 229 pesticides in Bolivia, 164 (72%) are 
considered toxic and 78 and highly dangerous. 75 of these are not authorized in the European 
Union. According to the PAN (Pesticide Action Network)’s list of highly hazardous pesticides, 
some these pesticides have been linked to cancer and numerous other health effects. Pesticide 
runoff has been known to destroy local biodiversity, leading to pest resistance, ecosystem 
instability, soil degradation, the extent to which these consequences are visible in Bolivia is 
currently unknow, however the proliferation of widespread pest damage and crop diseases in the 
2000s suggests that these chemicals are already taking their toll (Bascopé and Bickel 2018). 
 Furthermore, he growth of soy has resulted in displacement of small-scale agriculture. 
Despite the overall reduction of poverty in the country under Morales, this trend has not affected 
the city and countryside equally. While 31.2% of the urban population was impoverished in 
2015, in rural areas 71.5% still live-in poverty, with this poverty concentrated in the highlands 
and valleys with their higher population density and high number of indigenous people. (15-16) 




(22) Although, among lowland indigenous people, poverty rates are as high as 79% (Colque, 
Urioste and Eyzaguierre 2015, 24). As a Result, Bolivian food imports have increased 
precipitously alongside growth of soy, which was spurned by the commodity boom of the early 
2000s and the legalization of GM soy in 2005. (Colque, Urioste and Eyzaguierre 2015, 15) (Fig. 
3) Urioste asserts that expansion of the soy frontier has occurred across South America, in 
response to “unstoppable demand” of the Republic of China for soy. The southern cone, led by 
Brazil and Argentina, together has displaced the US as the main soybean producer in the world.  
 




Despite the failure of industrial agriculture to provide food sovereignty, Santa Cruz agroindustry 




and sovereignty,” and thus their demands must be met.  (Mamani, 4 Aug. 2016)  However, as 
Miguel Ángel Crespo, the director of Probioma asserts: "Bolivia is now importing 150 foods that 
it used to produce. It seems to us a fallacy to say that the agricultural frontier is going to be 
expanded to feed the country. That is not going to happen, because producers are looking for 
profitability, crops oriented to export. With the expansion of the agricultural frontier we are 
going to exacerbate the problem of climate change, we are seeing that now there are longer 
droughts and more torrential rains ". (Página Siete, 17 Oct. 2017) 
 Indeed, in 2017, Soybean production dropped by more than 50% due to droughts in the 
first half of the year and intense rains later in the year. (Página Siete, 8 Jan. 2017). In December 
of that year, under intense pressure from the agricultural sector, Evo Morales announced the free 
export of meat, sorghum, soybeans, sugar and their derivatives. (Página Siete, 19 Dec. 2017).  
Several days later, the department of Santa Cruz achieved autonomy Página Siete, 31 
Dec. 2017). 
Autonomy at last 
Costas celebrated the statute, saying “It is a statute that does not depart from the Political 
Constitution of the State, that allows to dream, invites the inclusion of that Santa Cruz of today 
and of the future.” Costas asserted that the autonomy statute is inclusive and was prepared with 
all of the inhabitants of the department of Santa Cruz in mind. He also emphasized that the 
autonomy statute was the “mandate of the people”, as was expressed in the autonomy protests 
The president of the Departmental Assembly, Marco Mejía, declared the autonomy statute; it is 
the achievement of the Santa Cruz people, it is the materialization of their struggles and their 





On January 30th, 2018, The Autonomy statute was implemented. The government of 
Santa Cruz emphasized that the statute was a “modern proposal that benefits all the citizens of 
Bolivia” yet argued that this process was not done. The Secretary of Government of the 
department stated, "With the promulgation of the autonomous statute a cycle of this feat is 
closed, and new challenges will surely come, among which are to achieve the Fiscal Pact and 
fight for more powers.” Along with the near-total territorial control granted by the autonomy 
statute, Santa Cruz agroindustry demanded total freedom of exports, which included a 
departmental land institute and a regional police force. 
It seems that with this autonomy statute, Santa Cruz elites will be able to carry out their 
vision of development, whether or not that benefits most Bolivians or even many individuals in 
their department benefit. As I have established, the elites of Santa Cruz do not wish to see 
themselves as part of an indigenous nation; instead, they prefer the homogenizing logic of 
monoculture and its associated power, regardless of the social or environmental impacts. 
Fernando Cuéllar, president of the CPSC expressed the department’s vision in 2017;  “Although 
Santa Cruz has a relatively acceptable economic and social development, according to Bolivian 
standards, this is not enough. We have to leave the Third World, we have to compare ourselves 
with the most advanced countries on the planet, that has to be the next objective.” (Ortiz 2017).  
 Following the developments of the 2010s, culminating in the 2019 wildfires, Morales’s 
use of the “vivir bien” principle and other indigenous ideologies rang empty to many observers. 
Bold asserts that the MAS came to represent an ‘indigenous’ identity that was “fetishized in the 
city” while embracing capitalism (Bold 2017, 129). Following the 2019 wildfires which 
destroyed 2.4 million hectares of forest, grassland and savanna in many pointed fingers at the 




clearances through burning) which was promulgated in 2019.(El Diario, 6 Sept. 2019). Bolivian 
professor José Luis Alvaro argued in Página Siete in July 2019 that MAS was recreating the 
“colonial and anti-indigenous extractivism, implanted here, in our country, by European invaders 
and genociders from and from the long 16th century.” (Saavedra, 14 Jul. 2019) 
The fires can be seen as a direct result of impoverishing nature of monocultures, rooted in 
their modernist logic which sees accumulation as the only way to development. As I have 
established in this chapter, the ideologies of the Santa Cruz elites became deeply rooted in the 
MAS in the 2010s, leading to disastrous consequences. The Santa Cruz elites were able to 
influence the government towards their system of monocultures and their modernizing logics, in 
which they strive to “leave the third world” no matter environmental or social cost. The MAS’s 
project, once articulating an “alternative to modernity,” shifted to embrace the modernizing 
logics of the Santa Cruz elites for fear of food shortages, along with mere economic and political 
convenience. To some extent, the MAS leaders also came to accept “monoculture of the mind” 
promoted by Santa Cruz and the surrounding world. Morales’ Vice President, García Linera 
stated in 2017 ‘deep down, everybody wants to be modern’ Colletta and Raftopolous 2020 13) 
 
 In Our Territory We Are Kings 
 Following the 2019 political crisis, the Bolivian Right grabbed power, and many poor 
and indigenous Bolivians came to see the re-election of the MAS as their only hope from a slide 
into fascism. Despite the landslide win of the MAS candidate in the 2020 elections, the system of 
monocultures which the MAS came to embrace is openly criticized in Santa Cruz and beyond, 




The connection between the destruction of biodiversity and diverse knowledge and 
culture is apparent to many indigenous critics of the MAS. Ruth Alípaz, and indigenous 
representative from La Paz, asserted “The indigenous people are territory. The link is only 
one. There are no indigenous people without territory. By devastating territories, we are 
devastating the population.” She says that the jungle is changing due to the damage caused by 
Monoculture. “All of this is a way of making us disappear as a culture” (Arteaga, 5 Nov. 2018). 
Rafael Quispe, the leader of a council of lowland indigenous people (CONMAQ) stated; 
“Capitalism or socialism is extractive, consumerist, developmentalist. In this sense, they are the 
same. We have to speak of a new model of development, an alternative to the system. Because 
both capitalism and socialism will go on changing the planet. And the development model of the 
indigenous peoples is the ayllu, the communitarian development model. We original peoples for 
thousands and thousands and thousands of years have been living in equilibrium and respect for 
our Pachamama (Mother Earth), from whom we emerged.”(Fabricant 2013 166)  
 Manuela Argarañaz, a representative of the association of indigenous counsels in San 
Ignacio, Santa Cruz argues that the greatest threats to her community are monoculture and the 
production of transgenic soybeans. She claims “The monoculture is linked to transnational 
companies, which give an advance to the peasants to deforest the forest and promise to pay the 
expenses, and then the balance remains for the communities. They buy the grain at a certain 
price, agreed with the communities, but when they see the production, the companies lower the 
price by 70 or 80%.” She asserts that this contributes to continued impoverishment of the 
peasants, who become trapped in cycles of debt, and are forced to deforest more to mee the debt. 
In her community, she says that around 200 families left the sustainable, diversified production 




production of Soy and other crops. "They are still looking for a way to get out of debt," says the 
leader. Furthermore, she asserts that agrochemicals from monoculture production “fall like rain” 
on nearby towns, and that the agribusinesses, many owned by foreigners, “do not care if we run 
out of water due to deforestation, they are only interested in taking money back to their 
countries.”  
Despite the grim circumstances that Argarañaz describes, she also expresses hope; “They 
say that the indigenous people are poor. Lie. Poverty is when the indigenous migrate to the city, 
where they do not have a home or anything to eat. In their land, the indigenous are one of the 


















CHAPTER 5. CONCLUSION: THINKING BEYOND MONOCULTURES 
 
An article in Él Diario a month after the election of Luis Arce Catacora, stated “21 days 
after the arrival of the new government… it was possible to observe the presence of a climate of 
complete tranquility and that gave the population the opportunity to relax and dedicate 
themselves to rebuilding their activities.” President Arce dismissed the “outdated” Minister of 
Agriculture and Lands,  demonstrating “ethics” and “the will to put an end to the populism that 
threatens to impose its designs and return to the days of unrest.”  The article asserted that Bolivia 
will “once again march along the broad paths of democracy.“ (El Diario, 5 Dec. 2020)  
In Arce’s few months in office, it is unclear what direction he will take in his relations 
with the Santa Cruz elite and the food regime as a whole. However, he has shown some 
commitment to taking on the oligarchies of the east. In April, 2021, Arce repealed Supreme 
Decrees 4232, 4238 and 4385 which had permitted access to certain biotechnologies for soybean, 
corn, wheat, cotton and sugar cane. The president of Anapo described it as a “great setback” and 
promised to push back against Arce (El Diario, 23 Apr. 2021). 
 In Bolivia, like other primary producer countries, the political geography inscribes the 
historical record of resource values upon the physical geography. Regions of Bolivia have gained 
political and economic power from resource values at times of commodity booms, yet when 
commodities bust power is reconfigured.  The tumultuousness of the markets for primary goods 
mean that this geography of power is rewritten every few years, though stratification along likes 
of race and class have remained a constant. Populist counter-neoliberal movements and 
indigenous movements have threatened this hegemony, however the party which 




natural resources and power. Under Morales, it chose the route of alliance with the Santa Cruz 
elite, thus compromising their original vision.  
 Territorial hegemony in Santa Cruz by the department elites was reinscribed through the 
identities and spectacles of the autonomy movement. This movement demonstrates how 
increasing salience of identity and sovereignty emerging from indigenous movements offers a 
new language of power and claims to territory. The Cruceño elite promulgated an identity rooted 
in space rather than history, obscuring the histories of colonial oppression and racism and 
confining indigenous identity and political power to the “Indio Permitido.”  
 Morales, in order to promote national food sovereignty and receive the tax revenue 
required for his social programs, increasingly sided with the Cruceño elite as the other 
commodities which the country relies on, particularly minerals and natural gas, lost value in the 
international market. Territorial control over natural resources promises economic and political 
power, however, in the primary-producer countries of the global south this power is tenuous and 
subject to the larger geographies of power. 
 Quijano and others in the field of post-colonial theory have argued that Latin American 
elites, often descended from colonial elites, have long seen themselves as more of citizens of 
Europe, somehow removed from the country they inhabit. The transnational partnerships and 
identities of these elite, etched across the American continent, provide easy pathways for the 
food regime to operate in (Quijano 1999). While the Landifusta system and the colonial elites 
such as those which thrive in Santa Cruz are not explicitly neoliberal- and some would be better 
described as feudal- their hegemonic power over their respective regions, constituted by and 
constitutive of violent defense of the severe land inequality, provide an opening for the 





Reflections on the Food Regime and Modernity  
 Shiva highlights something which has been developed by a number of scholars, that 
destruction of biodiversity very often coincides with destruction of cultures. However, she also 
highlights something of fundamental importance: that the “monoculture of the mind” in fact is a 
necessary precedent for the destruction of biodiversity and the production of monocultures 
(which itself facilitates and perpetuates the monoculture of the mind).  
 While primitive accumulation (Marx 1867) and accumulation by dispossession (Harvey 
2004) necessarily occur under conditions of violence and coercion, actors in the food regime 
must also work within layered systems of governance and law. Within liberal democracies in the 
global south, the food regime can be threatened by a democratic outcry by those displaced or 
harmed by agroindustry. Thus, as in the case of Santa Cruz, agro-industry must develop 
strategies to ally themselves with the national government, or else attempt to re-territorialize 
power in order to carry out their project of monocultures. In order to gain popular support for 
their project, agro-industry must cast themselves as part of a national project for economic 
development or “food sovereignty,” rooted in an ethic of modernization which makes alternative 
systems of agriculture invisible and perpetuates the “disappearance of alternatives.”  
 Food regime theory emphasizes the temporal specificity of the current corporate food 
system, while also revealing the spatial concentrations of power which have accelerated under 
the corporatization of the food system. Food regime theory historicizes the current geopolitical 
system of food without succumbing to the narrative of modernization, which casts the current 




understanding the food regime’s “monoculture of the mind” also requires one to identify the 
spatial and temporal identity of modernity itself.  
 In order to make sense of this, I draw from post-colonial theory, particularly that of a 
number of Latin American theorists. Escobar asserts these theorists proceed by “refracting 
modernity through the lens of colonially,” thus questioning the character of modernity and 
“unfreezing the potential for thinking from difference and towards the constitution of alternative 
worlds.”(Escobar 2004, 217) 
 These Latin American theorists identify the character of Modernity as inherently Euro-
centric, and the spread of modernity as the “imposition of global design by a particular local 
history, in such a way that it has subalternised other local histories and designs.”(Escobar 2004, 
217)These theories also “makes visible modernity’s underside, that is, this subaltern knowledges 
and cultural practices world-wide that modernity itself shunned, suppressed, made invisible 
made invisible and disqualified.” This understand is defined as “coloniality”, which manifests in 
“being, knowledge and power” and has existed side by side with modernity since the conquest of 
America. (210) It is “the same coloniality that asserts itself at the borders of the modem/colonial 
world system, and from which subaltern groups attempt to reconstitute place-based imaginaries 
and local worlds. From this perspective, coloniality is constitutive of modernity.” (Escobar 2004, 
210)Reframing modernity in such a way challenges the idea that modernity has triumphed, and 
will continue to be dominant all over the globe, that “from now on, it is modernity all the way 
down, everywhere, until the end of time.”(Escobar 2004, 211-212) 
 The anti-neoliberal social movements in Bolivia and the MAS regime can be seen as 
ways in which modernity, and its “underside” of colonially are openly criticized and contested 




alternative, sub-hegemonic knowledges- which modernity has attempt to delegitimate yet 
continue to circulate and hold legitimacy in spaces of alterity. Escobar identifies this 
phenomenon as “subaltern intelligent communities,” which he argues “enact practices of social, 
economic and ecological difference that are useful for thinking about alternative local and 
regional worlds.” (Escobar 2004, 210) 
 Escobar that politics of place are an essential component of imagining beyond modernity. 
He asserts that fears of the risk of ‘localisms’ are valid, however this does not discount the 
possibilities which can arise from politics of place; “). Politics of place is a discourse of desire 
and possibility that builds on subaltern practices of difference for the (re)construction of 
alternative socio-natural worlds…. In this articulation lies one of the best hopes of re-imagining 
and re-making local and regional worlds-in short, of 'worlds and knowledges otherwise.” 
 The project of the MAS, and the social movements which brought it to power, can be 
seen as a profoundly successful attempt to implement alternative knowledges, reimagining 
modernity and socionature at the scale of the nation. However, a ‘politics of place’ at the 
subnational level, articulated in the Santa Cruz autonomy movement, posed a serious threat to 
initially reimagining of modernity initially proposed by the MAS.  
 It may seem as if the Santa Cruz autonomy movement gives credence to the risk of 
‘localisms’ as Escobar describes (Escobar 2004, 210). However I caution against the hasty 
characterization of the autonomy movement as a true “politics of place.” As evident by the 
movement’s profoundly hegemonic leadership, and the violent socionatural effects of the 
monocultures it advocates, it seems to me the opposite; that the autonomy movement can be seen 




place. On the contrary, their ideology is that of euro-centric modernity, a local ideology which 
has been made to seem global and universal through the exclusion of alternatives.  
 The Santa Cruz elites and their movement constitute one of the many forms of what 
Escobar terms “social fascism” which maintain the conditions of the global south as subordinate 
to the north. The forces of social fascism increasingly occupy high levels of the state in the 
countries of the global south- Bolsonaro is a notable example. Populist, right wing authoritarians 
brought to power through corruption or democratic election from a populous who has come to 
believe that they too can become “modern.” In Santa Cruz, a relatively novel situation occurs in 
which the forces of social fascism are outside of the state and cast themselves as subaltern in 
order to further their hegemonic project of socionatural control.  
 The socionatural system which these elites promote, centered in a logic of extractivism 
and monoculture, is profoundly rooted in euro-centric notions of modernity and development. 
These systems result in profound environmental and social devastation, as has been seen 
particularly profoundly in recent years. These harms are most deeply felt by the indigenous and 
peasant population. Yet however much the elites of Santa Cruz wish to see themselves as the 
bearers and benefactors of this modernist system, they are not. Neither the worldview of euro-
centric modernity nor the food regime is oriented in their favor. As climate change and 
deforestation incurred by industrial agriculture devastate Bolivia’s socionature and make the 
“productive rationality” of Santa Cruz’s agriculture obsolete, the contradictions of these regimes 
are sure to become only more obvious, not only to those most dispossessed by the regime but 
even by the elites who see their system of agriculture failing before their very eyes. They will 
surely continue to overcome these issues through the technologies which the transnational 




salvation in climate change resistant GMOs and technologies. In the case of Santa Cruz and 
others, the modernizing project contradict itself, promoting destruction in pursuit of a system 
which is profitable for very few.  Subaltern peoples, knowledges and ecosystems become the 
“the victims of modernity, all of them victims of an irrational act that contradicts modernity’s 
ideal of rationality.”(Dussel 2000, 473). 
 This is not to say that the elites of Santa Cruz are to become an ally in the process of 
change- their ideology is too colonial, too extractivist. If monocultures of soy cease to be 
productive despite all attempts, the alliances of Santa Cruz elites who make up the CPSC and the 
logias will simply turn to another resource, another form of accumulation. However, it is my 
hope that the essential contradictions of their systems have been laid bare to the population of 
Santa Cruz, and Bolivia as a whole. The dream of the Santa Cruz elite, according to the Ximena 
Soruco, is the dream of “pure domination…..It is a field of war of where the enemy is 
eliminated. The dream of the Santa Cruz elite, therefore, is not the hegemonic dream, but a 
dream of domination, which cannot last long.”(Soruco, Plata and Medieros 2008, 94)  
 Throughout this thesis, I have intended to highlight the essential violence of the food 
regime and the broader systems of global capital by rooting theories of modernity in the earth- 
which sustains us and, which we are killing. The example of Santa Cruz Right lays bare how 
processes of violence, domination and social fascism form an essential part of the logic of our 
current food regime, although they may be invisible to us in the Global North. While global 
financial institutions, transnational corporations and dominant governments in the Global North 
uphold the systems of the food regime, they depend on coalitions with local power groups in the 




modernity and monoculture, facilitating the “disappearance of diversity” and thus, the 
“disappearance of alternatives.”  
 
Thinking of Alternatives in the Post-COVID-19 era 
 
In recent months, multiple crises caused by industrial agriculture and the COVID-19 pandemic 
exposed the socio-ecological fragility of the capitalist modernity, and could well be the beginning of a 
cascade of catastrophes which will impact humanity if this form of development persists (Altieri and 
Nicholls 2020, 881-882) The COVID-19 era has caused increased hunger, food riots and shortages along 
with massive amounts of ‘surplus’ food made up of crops left to rot in the fields and animals waiting to 
be killed. The Chief of the World Food Program asserted ‘There is […] a real danger that more people 
could potentially die from the economic impact of Covid-19 than from the virus itself’. .”(Ploeg 2020, 
948)  
A growing number of scholars have proposed Agro-ecology-forms of locally specific, diversified 
and sustainable agriculture inspired by peasant agricultures- as a way of thinking beyond our current 
food system. Altieri and Nicholls assert that Agroecology provides a path towards a post-COVID-19 
agriculture which is able to overcome the widespread disruption of food supplies through emphasizing 
small farms and diversified agriculture (Altieri and Nicholls 2020, 881).  
Ploeg asserts that the locally specific, diversified systems of peasant agriculture which provide 
the majority of the world’s food are “a formidable starting point for the much-needed new solutions for 
the post-pandemic period.”(Ploeg 2020, 966) Diversified small scale systems have been proven to be 
more resilient to climate change than monoculture systems (Altieri and Toledo, 2011 596). The way in 




pillars of land reform, food sovereignty, local expert knowledge, and diversified systems (Altieri, 
Nicholls and Montalba 2017, 2). In its totality, incorporating an agro-ecological approach means a return 
to “thinking in terms of diversity” (Shiva 1999). 
Monocultures dominate 80% of the 1.5 billion hectares of arable land on the planet, posing one 
of the largest threats to the global environment (Altieri and Nicholls 2020, 882) In this moment of 
socioeconomic crisis and climate change, the devastation is overwhelming. However in Latin America, 
this crisis, like the crisis of neoliberalism which spurned the “pink tide,” offers opportunities for 
thinking of alternatives. Furthermore, the centrality of agro-industry and land in this crisis provides 
fertile ground for land and food based collective action which challenge the very basis of the food 
regime and capitalist modernity as a whole.  If we are to build a more egalitarian, plural, and just world, 
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